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ELECTRICITY COMPETITION 
AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: 
RETHINKING MARKETS 
AND MONOPOLIES 
JONAS J. MONAST* 
The United States electricity sector is engaged in a long-term 
experiment regarding the proper role of market competition. 
Many states that transitioned to competitive electricity mar-
kets in the early 2000s are again reconsidering the relation-
ship between market competition and public policy goals. 
Low natural gas prices, falling costs of renewable energy and 
energy storage, and improvements in efficiency are causing 
early retirements of coal and nuclear power plants and thus 
affecting environmental policy goals and economic interests. 
States that continue to rely on monopoly utilities for electric-
ity are also reconsidering the role of competition, but from a 
different angle. Rather than focusing on mitigating the 
downsides of competition, some traditionally regulated states 
are creating new opportunities for third parties to compete 
with monopoly utilities. 
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on early drafts of this article. I am also grateful to Abbie Henderson, Courtney 
Johnson, Aaron McGlothlin, and Alyssa Wright for assisting with legal research, 
and to the editors at this journal for their helpful suggestions throughout the 
editing process. 
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The implications for electricity sectors in restructured and 
traditionally regulated states extend far beyond the particu-
lar facilities that stand to gain from new subsidies or the 
monopoly utilities subject to new forms of competition. Post 
hoc changes to market rules risk wasting resources that will 
be necessary to aggressively reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions, ensure long-term affordability, and mitigate the em-
ployment impacts of a transitioning sector. 
This Article explores the factors causing policymakers to re-
consider the role of competition in the pursuit of energy 
goals. It identifies lessons for realizing the benefits of elec-
tricity sector competition while managing the downsides that 
occur during periods of unanticipated change. In restruc-
tured markets, the lessons center on strategies to address job 
losses and achieve state environmental goals. In tradition-
ally regulated states, the lessons focus on opportunities to 
harness competition to deliver additional societal benefits 
without undermining the traditional rate-setting model for 
monopoly utilities. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Are markets or monopolies better suited to deliver afforda-
ble, reliable, and clean electric power? A long-term experiment 
is underway in the U.S. electricity sector to answer the ques-
tion. 
Historically, states relied on public utilities—vertically in-
tegrated monopolies that own electricity generation, transmis-
sion, and distribution systems—to provide affordable and reli-
able electric power.1 The federal government started creating 
opportunities for competition among wholesale electricity gen-
erators in the 1970s. Some states took more dramatic steps to 
foster electricity-sector competition in the 1990s and early 
2000s by transitioning away from vertically integrated utilities. 
Policymakers in these states believed competition would de-
liver lower electricity prices, better environmental outcomes, 
and greater opportunities for innovation.2 Other states contin-
ued to rely on traditional electric utilities, trusting the estab-
lished monopoly model to continue delivering affordable and 
reliable electricity.3 
Recent developments are causing policymakers to once 
again consider the balance between competitive markets, mo-
nopolies, and financial support for certain facilities. Some 
 
 1. DAVID P. TUTTLE ET AL., THE HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE U.S. 
ELECTRIC INDUSTRY 2–3 (2016), http://sites.utexas.edu/energyinstitute/files/2016/ 
09/UTAustin_FCe_History_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/M8TZ-FZHZ]. 
 2. See, e.g., ELIZABETH B. STEIN & FERIT UCAR, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, DRIVING 
ENVIRONMENTAL OUTCOMES THROUGH UTILITY REFORM 6–9 (Jan. 2018), https:// 
www.edf.org/sites/default/files/documents/driving-environmental-outcomes.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/P3AY-BKE9]. 
 3. TUTTLE ET AL., supra note 1, at 3. 
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states that embraced competitive markets are now grappling 
with whether, and how, to control the downsides of competi-
tion. Many nuclear and coal-fired power plants are struggling 
to remain profitable in competitive markets, due primarily to 
low natural gas prices.4 Some states have responded with new 
programs to compensate nuclear facilities for their role in 
providing carbon-free electricity.5 The Trump administration 
has proposed subsidizing economically vulnerable coal and nu-
clear facilities, justifying the move as necessary to ensure grid 
reliability.6 These strategies differ significantly from one an-
other in both their underlying policy goals and the data sup-
porting them. Without subsidies for nuclear power plants, 
states will be unable to meet their respective decarbonization 
goals.7 In contrast, the Trump administration is promoting 
subsidies for coal and nuclear facilities despite the lack of evi-
dence that the facilities are necessary for reliability.8 Although 
there are important differences between the state and federal 
efforts, they share an important trait: each attempts to insu-
late certain power plants from competitive pressures. 
States with monopoly utilities face a different set of ques-
tions. Rather than focusing on mitigating the downsides of 
competition, some traditionally regulated states are now ex-
ploring mechanisms to realize the benefits of competition while 
 
 4. Ari Natter, Coal Plants Keep Shutting Despite Trump’s Order to Rescue 
Them, BLOOMBERG (June 18, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-06-18/coal-plants-keep-shutting-despite-trump-s-order-to-rescue-them [https:// 
perma.cc/YFR6-GSC8]; see also Sonal Patel, More Premature Nuclear Unit 
Retirements Loom, POWER (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.powermag.com/more-
premature-nuclear-unit-retirements-loom/ [https://perma.cc/QJ3S-4CBV]. 
 5. DANIEL SHEA & KRISTY HARTMAN, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
STATE OPTIONS TO KEEP NUCLEAR IN THE ENERGY MIX 21–27 (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/energy/StateOptions_NuclearPower_f02
_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/5AC4-Z2EQ]. 
 6. Brad Plumer, Trump Orders a Lifeline for Struggling Coal and Nuclear 
Plants, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/01/climate/ 
trump-coal-nuclear-power.html [https://perma.cc/C3CB-LXXE]. 
 7. Russell Gold, Utility Jobs Lost as New Power Plants Need Fewer Workers, 
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/utility-jobs-shrink-as-
new-power-plants-need-fewer-workers-1516021200 [https://perma.cc/6AWJ-TVXW]; 
see also Brad Plumer, How Retiring Nuclear Power Plants May Undercut U.S. 
Climate Goals, N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/017/06/13 
/climate/nuclear-power-retirements-us-climate-goals.html [https://perma.cc/XM57-
4UFX]. 
 8. See infra Section III.B. 
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also preserving the cost-of-service model.9 Strategically harnes-
sing competition to enhance utilities’ accountability, respon-
siveness to consumer demands, and risk management practices 
can help protect ratepayers in the face of uncertain futures. 
Post hoc changes to rules for electricity-sector competition 
not only impact market participants but also risk wasting re-
sources that will be necessary to aggressively reduce green-
house gas emissions, ensure long-term affordability, and miti-
gate employment impacts of a transitioning sector. The chang-
ing approaches to competition also call into question the 
socially beneficial makeup of the electricity sector and the 
proper balance between competition and regulation. 
Numerous scholars are exploring the important jurisdic-
tional implications of these state and federal market interven-
tions.10 These inquiries focus on who may—or who should—es-
tablish energy policy goals and create the rules necessary to 
achieve them. The “who decides” question is a critical element 
in the energy policy debate, evidenced by the dramatic shift in 
federal policy priorities as the Trump administration seeks to 
overturn much of the Obama administration’s environmental 
regulations. Resolving jurisdictional arguments, however, would 
only address one aspect of the regulatory uncertainty hanging 
over electricity-sector stakeholders. Federal and state policy-
makers may pursue different choices if given broader authority 
over the sector, but both are second-guessing the proper role of 
competition in achieving energy policy goals. This perspective 
is not limited to one political ideology or to one region of the 
country, and jurisdictional certainty will not resolve questions 
regarding the proper role of market competition. 
This Article argues that competition can play an important 
role in achieving societal benefits in restructured and tradition-
ally regulated states.11 Doing so, however, requires proactive 
 
 9. See infra Part IV. “Cost of service” refers to compensating electric utilities 
for the cost of providing the service plus a rate of return that allows the company 
to attract investors and satisfy debt obligations. 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. Electricity markets take many forms, and it is not the goal of this Article 
to explore each. Furthermore, the distinctions between competitive electricity 
markets and traditionally regulated electricity markets are not absolute. States 
do not rely solely on one model or the other. Bilateral contracts, participation in 
wholesale electricity markets, renewable energy mandates, and fixed infra-
structure costs are just some examples of the interactions between electricity 
markets and public policy across the country. Yet these recent changes signal a 
7. MONAST_ (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  11:39 AM 
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strategies that address the downsides of competition. Electric-
ity market choices have social costs. These costs are reflected in 
electricity rates and the state’s resulting ability to attract and 
retain energy-intensive industries. They are also reflected in 
the job losses and related public health impacts in communities 
dependent on coal-fired generation, as well as the ongoing 
health and environmental costs associated with fossil-fuel-fired 
generation. 
There are models for incorporating these social and envi-
ronmental goals more directly into electricity governance. For 
example, many states that opted into competitive electricity 
markets in the early 2000s implemented a “competitive transi-
tion charge” to compensate utilities for any sunk costs that 
they could not otherwise recover.12 A similar approach could 
fund economic development and job retraining efforts in com-
munities suffering job losses as older power plants retire. The 
Federal Power Act and state utility laws are generally broad 
enough to allow greater consideration of environmental policy 
impacts. In traditionally regulated states, policymakers are al-
ready experimenting with new forms of electricity-sector com-
petition and could target these efforts to achieve social policy 
goals. 
The Article explores evolving approaches to markets and 
competition, but it does not take a position on the relative 
merits of competitive or traditionally regulated electricity sec-
tors. Both have value, particularly during a period of rapid 
technological developments.13 Some innovations are more 
likely to emerge in competitive markets where grid operators 
may be agnostic between the choice of purchasing additional 
electricity versus using other means to satisfy electricity 
demand.14 Traditionally regulated states may facilitate other 
 
more fundamental rethinking of competition and social policy. The result is a 
blending of market-based and cost-of-service approaches as policymakers seek the 
proper balance of social policy goals and market reliance. 
 12. See FRANCISCO FLORES-ESPINIO ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., 
COMPETITIVE ELECTRICITY MARKET REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PRIMER 9–10 (Dec. 2016), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy17osti/67106.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/F94L-3W88]. 
 13. William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking 
and Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 835–78 (2016) 
(discussing rate-setting innovations in competitive and traditionally regulated 
systems). 
 14. See Michael Wara, Fostering Competition in the 21st Century Electricity 
Industry, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 41, 47–48 (2016). 
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innovations, such as implementing new approaches to rate 
setting and incentivizing investment in next-generation energy 
technologies.15 
Part I provides a brief history of electricity-sector competi-
tion to provide context for the discussions of restructured and 
traditionally regulated electricity sectors that follow. Parts II 
and III explore the different relationships to competition in tra-
ditionally regulated and restructured markets.16 Proponents of 
restructuring argued that it would increase natural gas genera-
tion and remove barriers to energy efficiency and renewable 
energy.17 These rapid changes are leading some restructured 
states to implement their own market-correction efforts, such 
as “zero emission credits” (ZECs), and leading the Department 
of Energy to propose subsidies for coal and nuclear power 
plants.18 Part III contrasts these responses with efforts in 
traditionally regulated territories to expand opportunities for 
electricity competition: North Carolina’s new competitive pro-
curement process for solar energy, a Nevada law allowing en-
ergy users to exit the monopoly’s exclusive service territory, 
and a recent Nevada ballot measure calling for the state to re-
structure its electricity sector. 
Part IV identifies four crucial lessons for realizing social 
and environmental benefits in both competitive electricity mar-
kets and the territories of traditionally regulated monopolies. 
First, core societal values continue to drive electricity-sector 
policy and will have direct impacts on the evolution of the sec-
tor. Second, case-by-case efforts to support specific, existing 
 
 15. See, e.g., David A. Repka & Tyson R. Smith, Deep Decarbonization and 
Nuclear Energy, 48 ENVTL. L. REP. 10244, 10257 (2018) (discussing the role of cost 
recovery in incentivizing new nuclear construction). 
 16. Restructured states rely on regional transmission organizations (RTOs) to 
design and operate wholesale electricity markets to achieve the core energy 
values. The market rules benefit some market participants more than others (e.g., 
capacity auctions excluding intermittent resources such as solar energy). Some 
restructured states have been generally agnostic regarding electricity generation 
options, while others impose additional market-based measures on RTO markets 
(e.g., carbon markets, renewable portfolio standards, energy efficiency programs). 
This latter category of restructured states treats competition as the means to 
achieve numerous societal goals that extend beyond affordability and reliability. 
 17. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for 
Bulk Power, 72 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1986). 
 18. See Ray Gifford & Matt Larson, The DOE NOPR: An Inevitable Next Step 
in Power “Market” Regulation, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.utility 
dive.com/news/the-doe-nopr-an-inevitable-next-step-in-power-market-regulation 
/506703/ [https://perma.cc/468U-C4VS]; Plumer, supra note 6. 
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facilities are resulting in a post hoc cost-of-service approach 
without direct oversight of system needs and rates. Third, ZEC 
programs and the Trump administration’s proposed subsidies 
are reactions to electricity prices falling below the level nec-
essary to deliver social benefits. Without proactive measures to 
help communities weather economic impacts and ensure that 
states achieve environmental goals, reactive, case-by-case re-
sponses will likely continue. Finally, policymakers in tradi-
tionally regulated states may harness market forces to deliver 
new benefits to ratepayers without rejecting the monopoly 
utility model.19 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ELECTRICITY-SECTOR COMPETITION 
State oversight of the electricity sector once depended 
largely on monopoly utilities to provide affordable, reliable 
power.20 Public utilities accepted the obligation to provide 
affordable and reliable electricity at rates determined by state 
public utilities commissions (PUCs). In exchange, state law 
prohibited other entities from selling electricity to retail cus-
tomers within the utilities’ respective service territories.21 
PUCs replaced market competition with rates based on the 
utility’s costs of providing reliable electricity.22 This approach, 
referred to as cost-of-service rate setting, sought to compensate 
utilities for capital investments and ensure the financial viabil-
ity of the firm, including allowing a reasonable rate of return 
 
 19. This creates a new opportunity to realize the early vision of the public 
utility as an undertaking to “harness[ ] the power of private enterprise and 
direct[ ] it toward public ends.” William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon 
Future, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1614, 1619–20 (2014). 
 20. W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 325–
26 (2d ed. 1995). Allowing electric utilities, water utilities, and telecommunication 
companies to operate as monopolies took advantage of economies of scale, scope, 
and coordination. STEVE ISSER, ELECTRICITY RESTRUCTURING IN THE UNITED 
STATES: MARKETS AND POLICY FROM THE 1978 ENERGY ACT TO THE PRESENT 12–
13 (2015) (discussing the distinction between the terms deregulation and restruc-
turing in the context of electricity regulation). The adoption of the monopoly struc-
ture and state-imposed exclusive service territory was not intended to squash 
innovation. Boyd, supra note 19, at 1647 (“The broad concept of public utility 
advanced by progressives and legal realists thus embodied a pragmatic approach 
to competition and markets in an era of rapid industrial change . . . .”). 
 21. Joseph P. Tomain, Electricity Restructuring: A Case Study in Government 
Regulation, 33 TULSA L.J. 827, 832 (1998). 
 22. Id. 
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on capital investments to attract investors.23 Rate setting re-
moved financial risk for the electricity provider, allowing utili-
ties to access the capital and equity necessary for expensive in-
frastructure investments.24 State law granted public utilities 
exclusive service territories—specific geographic areas in which 
the respective public utility would be the exclusive provider of 
electricity.25 
Providing a rate of return for capital investments naturally 
incentivizes the private firm to pursue high-cost infrastructure 
projects.26 PUCs control for this incentive by relying on the 
“least cost mandate” approach—with the default assumption 
that a prudent investment by a regulated monopoly is the 
lowest-cost option that meets demand, complies with applicable 
laws, and satisfies other relevant criteria.27 
The cost-of-service rate-setting model has been the subject 
of multiple criticisms over the years, including: regulatory cap-
ture;28 information asymmetries between utilities and utility 
commissions resulting in approval of unnecessary, or unneces-
sarily expensive, capital projects;29 and inherent incentives for 
utilities to maximize capital expenditures in order to increase 
shareholder returns.30 These criticisms were amplified in the 
 
 23. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13, at 827. 
 24. See, e.g., Boyd, supra note 19, at 1643–44. “The planning, sequencing, and 
financing of hundreds of billions of dollars in new investments needed to modern-
ize the electric power grid and build new low carbon generation will require a 
level of certainty regarding cost recovery that markets alone will have difficulty 
providing.” Id. at 1618. 
 25. Id. at 1643. 
 26. Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under 
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1068 (1962). 
 27. Jonas J. Monast, Maximizing Utility in Electric Utility Regulation, 43 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 146–49 (2015). 
 28. Boyd, supra note 19, at 1652 (citing George J. Stigler, The Theory of 
Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3 (1971)). 
 29. Paul L. Joskow, Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice: Electricity 
Distribution and Transmission Networks, in ECONOMIC REGULATION AND ITS 
REFORM: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED? 291 (2014), http://www.nber.org/chapters/ 
c12566.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4NP-EAEC]; Adam R. Fremeth & Guy L.F. 
Holburn, Information Asymmetries and Regulatory Decision Costs: An Analysis of 
U.S. Electric Utility Rate Changes 1980-2000, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 127 (2012); 
John S. Moot, Economic Theories of Regulation and Electricity Restructuring, 25 
ENERGY L.J. 273, 287 (2004) (noting that cost-of-service ratemaking was blamed 
for exacerbating nuclear cost overruns because facilities were not cancelled early); 
David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. 
REV. 765, 771 (2008). 
 30. JIM LAZAR & REGULATORY ASSISTANCE PROJECT STAFF, ELECTRICITY 
REGULATION IN THE US: A GUIDE 86–87 (2d ed. 2016), http://www.raponline.org/ 
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late 1970s and 1980s as the combination of high inflation, de-
creased demand for electricity, and the Three Mile Island acci-
dent resulted in cancelled nuclear projects.31 
Many of the critics of vertically integrated electric utilities 
argued that competitive markets would result in lower prices 
and better services, enhance innovation, and better achieve en-
vironmental goals.32 The criticisms were not uniform, how-
ever.33 Over half of the states continued to view the vertically 
integrated electric utility as the best option for meeting elec-
tricity-sector goals, but a growing chorus of stakeholders and 
policymakers viewed competition as necessary to induce cost 
discipline on utility executives.34 
The 1978 Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA) 
was an initial step toward utilizing competition to transform 
the electricity sector in socially beneficial ways.35 The law re-
quired local utilities to purchase power from qualifying facili-
 
wp-content/uploads/2016/07/rap-lazar-electricity-regulation-US-june-2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/D9SK-RU6Y] (noting that traditional monopoly utility regula-
tion may incentivize higher operating expenses because understaffed PUCs often 
approve higher operating expenses that can increase the revenues that utilities 
are allowed to earn in future years); Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of 
Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 448 (2002). 
 31. See Pierce, supra note 17, at 1183–86; see also Douglas Martin, 3 Mile 
Island: Financial Fallout, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1981, at D1, https://www.ny 
times.com/1981/01/13/business/3-mile-island-financial-fallout.html [https://perma. 
cc/AU72-BJ85]. 
 32. See, e.g., Pierce, supra note 17, at 1192 (“These inefficiencies fall into 
seven basic categories: (1) incomplete realization of economies of scale and 
coordination; (2) distortion of investment decisions by Averch-Johnson and 
negative Averch-Johnson effects; (3) opportunistic behavior by regulators; (4) 
intertemporal distortion of rates and investment decisions caused by embedded 
cost ratemaking; (5) inefficiencies created by retail rate structures not based on 
marginal cost principles; (6) distorted purchase and use incentives created by 
wholesale rate structures not based on marginal cost principles; and (7) 
distortions created by opportunities to purchase bulk power from loosely regulated 
corporate affiliates.”). 
 33. Douglas Gagax & Kenneth Nowotny, Competition and the Electric Utility 
Industry: An Evaluation, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 63, 72–76 (1993) (noting the 
continued cost benefits of centralized electricity generation). 
 34. Spence, supra note 29, at 774–75; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., STATUS OF 
STATE ELECTRIC INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING ACTIVITY AS OF FEBRUARY 2003 (Feb. 
2003), https://www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/legislation/california/pdf/restructure.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/JL94-TKDW]. 
 35. See Public Utilities Regulatory Policy Act, 16 U.S.C. § 2601 (2012); see 
also Chris Warren, Once an Obscure Law, PURPA Now Drives Utility-Scale Solar. 
Regulatory Conflict Quickly Followed, GREENTECH MEDIA (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/purpa-is-causing-conflict-in-montana 
[https://perma.cc/9CDR-75DZ]. 
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ties at the utility’s “avoided cost,” thus reducing barriers to 
electricity generation from renewable energy and combined-
heat-and-power sources.36 In doing so, PURPA required utili-
ties and PUC commissioners to treat electricity generation and 
delivery as separate services with different prices.37 Together, 
these steps “demonstrated the viability of competitive entry 
into the capital-intensive power generation business.”38 Subse-
quent steps to unbundle transmission and generation services 
include FERC Order 888, which requires open access to inter-
state transmission lines and lays out initial requirements for 
independent system operators (ISOs), and FERC Order 2000, 
which establishes requirements for regional transmission or-
ganizations.39 
Some states opted to move away from cost-of-service 
regulation in the 1990s and 2000s following FERC’s efforts to 
facilitate market-based competition.40 These states required 
their state-regulated monopoly utilities to divest themselves of 
generation and transmission assets.41 In these states, monop-
olies still operate electricity grids to deliver power to retail cus-
tomers (i.e., end users of electricity).42 Some of these states al-
 
 36. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)–(b); Moot, supra note 29, at 274. 
 37. PURPA, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (Nov. 9, 1978); Spence, supra 
note 29, at 772–74. 
 38. Matthew W. White, Power Struggles: Explaining Deregulatory Reforms in 
Electricity Markets, BROOKINGS PAPERS: MICROECONOMICS 201, 207 (1996), 
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/1996/01/1996_bpeamicro_white.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YWX3-WL6Z]. 
 39. Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 65 Fed. Reg. 810 
(Jan. 6, 2000); Jim Rossi, The Common Law “Duty to Serve” and Protection of 
Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1233, 1280 (1998) (“[T]he most significant event to date in electricity 
industry restructuring is a rulemaking FERC adopted in 1996, known as the 
electricity mega-Grid Resiliency NOPR or Order No. 888. Order No. 888 is 
designed to restructure wholesale markets for electricity, in a manner similar to 
FERC’s competitive restructuring of the natural gas industry which FERC 
achieved in 1992 by adopting Order No. 636.”). 
 40. Ari Peskoe, Easing Jurisdictional Tensions by Integrating Public Policy in 
Wholesale Electricity Markets, 38 ENERGY L.J. 1, 3–4 (2017); Boyd, supra note 19, 
at 1628–29. Numerous states were at various stages of considering restructuring 
but put those efforts on hold in the aftermath of the California electricity crisis. 
Spence, supra note 29, at 774–75 (“[The] California energy crisis of 2000−2001 
cowed some states into halting their restructuring plans, though retail 
competition continued in sixteen states and the District of Columbia.”). 
 41. See Spence, supra note 29, at 784 n.104; ISSER, supra note 20, at 1 
(discussing the distinction between the terms deregulation and restructuring in 
the context of electricity regulation). 
 42. Rossi, supra note 39, at 1283. 
7. MONAST_ (DO NOT DELETE) 4/10/2019  11:39 AM 
678 UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90 
low consumers to choose their electricity provider, while others 
rely on the operator of local grids to purchase and deliver elec-
tricity.43 PUCs continue to oversee rates charged for the opera-
tion of these distribution systems and, in instances where dis-
tribution companies are purchasing power on behalf of their 
consumers, the prices distribution companies pay for electric-
ity.44 These restructured states depend on regional transmis-
sion organizations (RTOs) or independent system operators 
(ISOs) to operate wholesale electricity markets and the trans-
mission systems.45 
The details of restructuring vary by state. When this Arti-
cle refers to competitive markets, it is primarily referencing ex-
periences in three RTO/ISO markets—PJM, New York ISO 
(NYISO), and New England (ISO-NE)—for four reasons.46 The 
first is size. Together, these RTO territories serve a population 
of almost one hundred million.47 The second is FERC jurisdic-
tion, which makes federal oversight of wholesale electricity 
markets a key factor.48 (The Texas electricity system (ERCOT) 
presents some of the same issues, but because the system is en-
tirely within the state borders, FERC does not have jurisdic-
tion.49) The third is the fact that these markets include restruc-
tured states. The NYISO is fully restructured, as is ISO-NE, 
 
 43. David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity Market, 
15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 202 (2005). 
 44. Jonas J. Monast & Sarah K. Adair, Completing the Energy Innovation 
Cycle: The View from the Public Utility Commission, 65 HASTINGS L.J. 1345, 
1378–81 (2014) (discussing Rhode Island PUC oversight of a contract to purchase 
electricity from an offshore wind facility). 
 45. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13, at 837. 
 46. Other RTOs, such as the Midcontinent ISO (MISO) and the Southwest 
Power Pool (SPP) strike a middle ground, with electricity generators competing in 
energy markets but PUCs still providing cost recovery for capital investments and 
therefore addressing capacity needs. 
 47. See PJM, PJM LOAD FORECAST REPORT 9 (2018), https://www.pjm.com/-
/media/library/reports-notices/load-forecast/2018-load-forecast-report.ashx?la=en 
[https://perma.cc/8DPF-VFEJ]; Key Grid and Market Stats, ISO-NEW ENGLAND, 
https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2018) [https://perma. 
cc/PUK5-KU3J]; TARIQ NIAZI, N.Y. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
NYISO & NY’S WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY MARKETS 5 (May 25, 2016), https://www 
.nyserda.ny.gov/-/media/Files/EDPPP/LIFE/Conferences/ [https://perma.cc/WH2E-
Q73D]. 
 48. See Clinton Vince et al., What Is Happening and Where in the World of 
RTOs and ISOs?, 27 ENERGY L.J. 65, 76–80 (2006). 
 49. David B. Spence, Introduction to ERCOT’s Jurisdictional Status, 3 TEX. J. 
OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 1, 1 (2008). 
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with the exception of Vermont.50 PJM is a hybrid market that 
includes some restructured states and some that require elec-
tric utilities to transfer control of transmission assets to the 
RTO and participate in competitive energy markets, but PUCs 
continue their historic rate-setting role.51 The final reason is 
that each of these markets include nuclear power plants that 
have recently become uneconomic due to low natural gas 
prices.52 
RTO market design choices are not agnostic. The manner 
in which RTOs price various attributes (e.g., location and abil-
ity to dispatch when needed) influences the relative competi-
tiveness among energy resources.53 Reliability rules dictate 
certain investments, and RTOs regularly adjust capacity 
auction rules to incentivize a sufficient number of generation 
owners to ensure that their facilities will be available to 
provide electricity at a future date.54 Capacity markets, for 
example, may reward dispatchable generation options (i.e., 
power plants that can provide electricity when needed, in 
contrast to energy resources such as solar and wind), create 
barriers to renewable energy investments, and minimize the 
role of state energy policies.55 
 
 50. See Vermont Electric Utilities, VT. DEPT. OF PUB. SERV., http://public 
service.vermont.gov/electric (last visited Oct. 7, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4R8M-
24L94]; SUSAN F. TIERNEY, THE NEW YORK INDEPENDENT OPERATING SYSTEM: A 
TEN-YEAR REVIEW 2 (2010), https://www.analysisgroup.com/uploadedfiles/content/ 
insights/publishing/tierney_nyiso_10_year_review.pdf  [https://perma.cc/2YKW-
94JQ]. 
 51. See Erin T. Mansur, Upstream Competition and Vertical Integration in 
Electricity Markets, 50 J.L. & ECON. 125, 125–26 (2007). 
 52. See David Solimeno, Note, Armageddon: The Inevitable Death of Nuclear 
Power and Whether New York State Has the Legal Authority to Keep It on Life 
Support, 35 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 135, 143–44 (2017). 
 53. Danny Cullenward & Shelley Welton, The Quiet Undoing: How Regional 
Electricity Market Reforms Threaten State Clean Energy Goals, 36 YALE J. ON 
REG. (2018–19), http://yalejreg.com/the-quiet-undoing-how-regional-electricity-
market-reforms-threaten-state-clean-energy-goals/ [https://perma.cc/K43R-ELGV] 
(criticizing FERC efforts to undermine state renewable energy policies). 
 54. Capacity markets don’t guarantee that the electricity will be purchased. 
Instead, they pay companies for being available if needed. Emily Hammond & 
David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 
141, 153 (2016). 
 55. Cullenward & Welton, supra note 53; 163 FERC ¶ 61,236 (2018). 
“Resource offers (or bids into the market) that are deemed subsidized would be 
subject to an expanded Minimum Offer Price Rule (MOPR) with few or no 
exceptions, which would bump up these offers to a price deemed competitive.” 
Jennifer Chen, Understanding FERC’s Order Rejecting PJM’s Capacity Market 
Proposals and the Proposed Replacement Framework, NICHOLAS INST.: DUKE U. 
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Other examples of utilizing competition to achieve social 
goals abound. Twenty-nine states have implemented renewable 
portfolio standards that create mandatory renewable energy 
targets, thus guaranteeing market demand for qualifying re-
newable energy generation.56 State net metering policies create 
market incentives for homeowners and businesses to invest in 
rooftop solar generation.57 Some RTOs and ISOs utilize capac-
ity markets—essentially auctions for the promise that dis-
patchable electricity generation will be prepared to supply 
power at a later date—to address concerns that electricity mar-
ket prices may not incentivize sufficient construction and main-
tenance investments necessary to ensure reliability.58 State 
and federal policies utilize market-based environmental poli-
cies to create incentives to invest in pollution control technol-
ogies and/or lower-emitting resources.59 RTOs, stakeholders, 
and scholars are considering strategies to implement carbon 
pricing pursuant to the existing authority in the Federal Power 
Act.60 An emerging focus on transactive energy—a dynamic ap-
proach to electricity markets that can accommodate distributed 
resources and integrate smart grid technologies—demonstrates 
potential changes to platforms facilitating competition.61 
 
(July 18, 2018), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/articles/understanding-ferc 
%E2%80%99s-order-rejecting-pjm%E2%80%99s-capacity-market-proposals-and-
proposed [https://perma.cc/993Y-49WE]; see also Jennifer Chen, PJM’s New Rules 
Skew Against Clean Energy; Silver Lining in a Lower Forecast, NRDC: EXPERT 
BLOG (May 24, 2016), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/jennifer-chen/pjms-new-
rules-skew-against-clean-energy-silver-lining-lower-forecast [https://perma.cc/ 
NW86-7BHZ]. 
 56. State Renewable Portfolio Standards and Goals, NAT’L CONF. STATE 
LEGISLATURES (July 20, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/renewable-
portfolio-standards.aspx [https://perma.cc/5DWG-VDRP]. 
 57. See Julia Pyper, More Than Half of U.S. States Are Studying or Changing 
Net Metering Policies, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 13, 2015), https://www.greentech 
media.com/articles/read/more-than-half-of-us-states-are-studying-or-changing-net-
metering-policies [https://perma.cc/86AV-B72D]. 
 58. Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, 
49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1824 (2016). 
 59. Jonas Monast, From Top-Down to Bottom-Up Climate Policy: New 
Challenges in Carbon Market Design, 8 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 175, 
180, 185 (2017). 
 60. Peskoe, supra note 40, at 15–16. 
 61. Transactive Energy: An Overview, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. 
(Apr. 19, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/engineering-laboratory/smart-grid/transactive-
energy-overview [https://perma.cc/KL2L-3HYK]; see also Joel B. Eisen & Felix 
Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 49, 53–54, 57–77 
(2018). 
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These market interventions are important elements of the 
complex policy ecosystem that will influence the future makeup 
of the U.S. electricity grid, but a detailed analysis of the respec-
tive efforts is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, this 
analysis focuses on recent shifts in views of competition that 
are seemingly at odds with a state’s chosen approach—competi-
tive markets or monopoly utilities—to identify lessons for the 
role of competition in achieving social goals. 
II. RETHINKING COMPETITION IN RESTRUCTURED STATES 
Competitive electricity markets have been far more disrup-
tive to the power sector than the proponents of restructuring 
could have foreseen.62 Natural gas prices are hovering at his-
toric lows.63 Electricity-demand growth is generally flat and 
may soon decline.64 Prices for wind and solar energy have fal-
len significantly and both are playing a growing role in electri-
city generation.65 In some states, wind energy is able to com-
 
 62. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DOE/EIA-0383, ANNUAL ENERGY 
OUTLOOK 2006 WITH PROJECTIONS TO 2030 (Feb. 2006), https://www.eia.gov/ 
outlooks/archive/aeo06/electricity.html [https://perma.cc/7FVW-NBU8] (projecting 
that “[c]oal-fired and natural-gas-fired plants account for about 50 percent and 40 
percent, respectively, of the capacity additions from 2004 to 2030”). As further 
evidence of the rapidly changing market dynamics, the 2006 Annual Energy 
Outlook states that “[c]oal-fired capacity is generally more economical to operate 
than natural-gas-fired capacity, because coal prices are considerably lower than 
natural gas prices. As a result, new natural-gas-fired plants are built to ensure 
reliability and operate for comparatively few hours when electricity demand is 
high.” Id. 
 63. Future U.S. Electricity Generation Will Depend Largely on Natural Gas 
Prices, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Feb. 7, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayin 
energy/detail.php?id=34852 [https://perma.cc/5WSX-JX96] [hereinafter Future 
U.S. Electricity Generation]. Note, however, that natural gas prices exhibit 
seasonal fluctuations, with higher prices in winter months due to increased 
demand for heat. Natural Gas Prices Reflect Decreasing Seasonality, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Nov. 20, 2013), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id= 
13871 [https://perma.cc/QQ9B-YBVJ]. 
 64. U.S. Economy and Electricity Demand Growth Are Linked, but Relation-
ship Is Changing, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.eia 
.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=10491 [https://perma.cc/AFN3-PFTD]. 
 65. See Jairo Chung & Jim Hempstead, Utilities Increasingly Adding Low 
Cost Wind Power to Rate Base, Leaving Inefficient Coal Plants at Risk, MOODY’S 
INV. SERV. (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Utilities-
increasingly-adding-low-cost-wind-power-to-rate--PR_363547 [https://perma.cc/ 
SB54-RPR3]; Michael O’Boyle, Wind and Solar Are Our Cheapest Electricity 
Generation Sources. Now What Do We Do?, GREENTECH MEDIA (Jan. 26, 2017), 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/wind-and-solar-are-our-cheapest-
electricity-generation-sources-now-what-do#gs.KyyugMY [https://perma.cc/T8HW-
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pete on a cost basis with coal.66 Coal-fired power plants pro-
vided approximately half of the nation’s electricity generation 
between 1995 and 2005, but that number dropped to 30 percent 
by 2015, and additional retirements are expected to continue at 
least through the near future.67 “War on coal” rhetoric that was 
common during most of the Obama presidency suggested that 
these impacts were due to deliberate policy choices, but it was 
 
MGKK] (explaining that while solar and wind pricing have decreased 
dramatically since 2009, certain states have seen more of a decrease than others); 
Earl J. Ritchie, The Cost of Wind and Solar Intermittency, FORBES (Jan. 24, 2017), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2017/01/24/the-cost-of-wind-and-solar- 
intermittency [https://perma.cc/MF7J-228B]. 
 66. Ritchie, supra note 65. 
 67. MJ BRADLEY & ASSOC., COAL-FIRED ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND FUTURE OUTLOOK 2 fig.1 (Aug. 28, 2017), http://www.mj 
bradley.com/sites/default/files/MJBAcoalretirementissuebrief.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
YN8Y-QA55]. Coal-fired power plants  
[A]ccounted for 51 percent of total U.S. electricity generation on average 
from 1949 through 2005. However, since that time, coal’s share of 
generation has declined at a steady clip [ ]. In 2016, U.S. coal plants 
accounted for just 30 percent of total generation output, according to 
government figures—2016 was a year of record low natural gas prices in 
the U.S. contributing to the decline in coal generation. For the first time, 
in 2016, natural gas was the leading source of electricity generation (34 
percent of total generation), reflecting an on-going trend that is 
reshaping the nation’s generation mix. 
Id. at 1. Coal retirements between 2010 and 2015 were caused by a combination of 
low natural gas prices and the EPA’s 2011 rule limiting mercury emissions. Coal 
Made Up More Than 80% of Retired Electricity Generating Capacity in 2015, U.S. 
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Mar. 6, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail 
.php?id=25272 [https://perma.cc/6HRD-QHQN]; FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, 
OFFICE OF ENERGY PROJECTS ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE UPDATE (2017), https:// 
www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/2017/nov-energy-infrastructure.pdf [https://perma 
.cc/ZBZ9-8NNM] (projecting retirement of an additional 20 gigawatts (GW) of coal-
fired capacity by 2020, compared to 92 GW of new natural gas-fired capacity, 72 
GW of new wind capacity, and 43.5 GW of new solar capacity in the same 
timeframe). Reduced demand for coal-fired power is a consistent trend over the 
past decade. Power Sector Coal Demand Has Fallen in Nearly Every State Since 
2007, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 28, 2016), http://wnew.www.eia.gov/ 
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=26012 [https://perma.cc/F4AB-WLHW]. Additional 
coal retirements were announced as this Article was in the editing process. Rye 
Druzin, Texas Coal Plant to Shut Down by 2020, HOUS. CHRONICLE (Sept. 25, 
2018, 11:28 AM), https://www.chron.com/business/energy/article/Texas-coal-plant-to 
-shut-down-by-2020-13255710.php [https://perma.cc/3LX3-7N8J]; Robert Walton, 
FirstEnergy to Retire More Than 4 GW of PJM Coal Plant Capacity, UTIL. DIVE 
(Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/firstenergy-to-retire-more-than-
4-gw-of-pjm-coal-plant-capacity/531300/ [https://perma.cc/F9WH-865H]. 
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primarily market and technological changes that undercut 
coal’s dominance in the electricity sector.68 
Existing nuclear power plants in competitive markets also 
struggled with the quick change in market prices.69 The Kewa-
unee Power Station in Wisconsin and the Vermont Yankee Nu-
clear Power Station in Vermont were the first nuclear units to 
cite low natural gas prices as a primary factor in decisions to 
retire nuclear power plants.70 Six additional nuclear plants are 
scheduled to retire by 2026, and Exelon has indicated that it 
will retire the Three Mile Island facility in Pennsylvania unless 
it receives support to make the plant financially viable.71 Even 
nuclear power plants that remain economically viable are fac-
ing the expiration of their federal operating permits within a 
 
 68. See Sam Kalen, Coal’s Plateau and Energy Horizon?, 34 PUB. LAND & 
RES. L. REV. 145, 147–48 (2013). 
 69. See STEVE CLEMMER ET AL., THE NUCLEAR POWER DILEMMA: DECLINING 
PROFITS, PLANT CLOSURES, AND THE THREAT OF RISING CARBON EMISSIONS 1 
(Nov. 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2018/11/Nuclear-
Power-Dilemma-full-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/X6JX-6W7H] (citing “the economic 
challenges brought on by cheap natural gas, diminished demand for electricity, 
falling costs for renewable energy, rising operating costs, and safety and 
performance problems” as the primary factors causing early retirement of nuclear 
power plants in the United States); EDWARD KEE, NUCLEAR ECON. CONSULTING 
GROUP, THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR POWER 2–3, 13 (2017), https://www.eia.gov 
/conference/2017/pdf/presentations/edward_kee.pdf [https://perma.cc/HN88-RT96] 
(attributing in part the inability of some nuclear power plants to remain open in a 
competitive market to a failure of the market). 
 70. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant Closure in 2014 Will Challenge New 
England Energy Markets, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Sept. 6, 2013), https://www. 
eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=12851 [https://perma.cc/9UVC-QJ7G] (citing 
low electricity prices, low capacity market prices, and high operating costs as 
factors leading to the retirement of Vermont Yankee); Matthew L. Wald, As Price 
of Nuclear Energy Drops, a Wisconsin Plant Is Shut, N.Y. TIMES (May 7, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/08/business/energy-environment/kewaunee-nuclear-
power-plant-shuts-down.html [https://perma.cc/43G2-BSDV]. Two additional nu-
clear plants retired in 2013 due to maintenance issues. Matthew L. Wald, Nuclear 
Plants, Old and Uncompetitive, Are Closing Earlier Than Expected, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 14, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/15/business/energy-environment/ 
aging-nuclear-plants-are-closing-but-for-economic-reasons.html [https://perma.cc/ 
A4BZ-BFHQ]. 
 71. Three Mile Island Is the Latest Nuclear Power Plant to Announce 
Retirement Plans, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 13, 2017), https://www.eia.gov 
/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31612 [https://perma.cc/3QNC-UM86] (“In the an-
nouncement of its plan to retire Three Mile Island, Exelon noted that the plant 
had not been profitable for the past five years, and they sought subsidies from 
Pennsylvania to provide the financial support necessary to keep the plant open.”). 
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decade and thus must soon determine whether to undertake 
the investments required to secure a license extension.72 
Of all of the changes facing the sector, the rapid decline of 
natural gas prices is the most important driver of the dramatic 
transition underway in the electricity sector.73 Prior to the 
shale gas revolution, natural-gas-fired turbines were inexpen-
sive to construct but costly to operate due to the high cost of 
natural gas compared to other fuels relied upon for electricity 
generation.74 As a result, natural-gas-fired generation was gen-
erally limited to providing power during periods of higher elec-
tricity demand—peak load.75 Efficient extraction of shale gas 
quickly changed the equation. 
According to the Department of Energy: 
The increased use of natural gas in the electric sector has 
resulted in sustained low wholesale market prices that re-
duce the profitability of other generation resources im-
portant to the grid. The fact that new, high-efficiency natu-
ral gas plants can be built relatively quickly, compared to 
coal and nuclear power, also helped to grow gas-fired 
generation. Production costs of coal and nuclear plants re-
mained somewhat flat, while the new and existing, more 
flexible, and relatively lower-operating cost natural gas 
plants drove down wholesale market prices to the point that 
some formerly profitable nuclear and coal facilities began 
operating at a loss.76 
 
 72. See Krysti Shallenberger, FPL’s Turkey Point Becomes First Nuclear Plant 
to Seek Second License Renewal, UTIL. DIVE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.utility 
dive.com/news/fpls-turkey-point-becomes-first-nuclear-plant-to-seek-second-license-
renew/516441 [https://perma.cc/Q5CA-RDQ8]. 
 73. Natural gas prices have historically been volatile. Projections of sustained 
low prices, rather than short-term drops in prices, are the critical factor here. 
Future U.S. Electricity Generation, supra note 63. 
 74. See Tyler Hodge, EIA Forecasts Natural Gas to Remain Primary Energy 
Source for Electricity Generation, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 22, 2018), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34612 [https://perma.cc/BM54-
3K33]. 
 75. See Average Utilization of the Nation’s Natural Gas Combined-Cycle 
Power Plant Fleet Is Rising, U.S. ENERGY INFO ADMIN. (June 9, 2011), https:// 
www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=1730 [https://perma.cc/3G2Q-Q796] 
[hereinafter Average Utilization of the Nation’s Natural Gas]. 
 76. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, STAFF REPORT TO THE SECRETARY ON ELECTRICITY 
MARKETS AND RELIABILITY 13 (2017), https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017 
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While the impacts of shale gas extraction were largely un-
anticipated during initial state debates over restructuring, it is 
no accident that natural gas is playing a larger role in the elec-
tricity sector.77 Increasing natural gas generation was a key 
goal of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 and of electricity restruc-
turing, and these federal and state measures expanding oppor-
tunities for competition opened the door for shale gas to even-
tually play a transformative role.78 
State and federal responses to these changing market con-
ditions focus on delaying retirements of certain facilities by im-
plementing new payments for particular attributes. A growing 
number of states with restructured electricity sectors are re-
sponding to the threat of early retirement of nuclear power 
plants by implementing new requirements that distribution 
companies (monopolies operating local electricity grids) pur-
chase ZECs from nuclear power plants that are unable to out-
compete other generation sources in competitive wholesale 
markets.79 These programs seek to achieve state environmen-




 77. Peter Navarro, A Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring the 
Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347, 353 (1995) (“New and improved low-cost, 
high heat rate, combined cycle natural gas plants are now competitive with 
traditional large central station plants—at least at today’s natural gas prices. 
While we shall question in far more detail below whether these natural gas plants 
truly spell the death of natural monopoly in the generation market, the current 
conventional wisdom is that they do. This claim is a primary basis for the overall 
restructuring efforts.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Sean Casten, No Longer Cheap—So What Next?, 53 FORT. 
SPARK 1 (2008) (noting that FERC-facilitated market liberalization helped 
incentivize independent power producers to invest in natural gas-fired gen-
eration). The anticipated role of new natural gas generation was primarily to 
provide power during periods of peak electricity demand rather than direct 
competition with the coal and nuclear power plants that historically provided 
baseload power—generation that consistently runs to provide power at all times 
during the day. See Average Utilization of the Nation’s Natural Gas, supra note 75 
(“[T]he low cost of coal relative to natural gas until recent years favored the use of 
coal-fired generating units to fulfill baseload electricity demand, leading plant 
operators to run these units at rates close to their output capacity during peak 
demand hours. During off-peak hours, such as overnight, coal plants generally 
continued to operate.”). 
 79. DANIEL SHEA & KRISTY HARTMAN, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, 
STATE OPTIONS TO KEEP NUCLEAR IN THE ENERGY MIX  25 (Jan. 2017), 
http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/energy/StateOptions_NuclearPower_f02
_WEB.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4PL-72U4]. 
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ties.80 At least one state—Ohio—has also considered imple-
menting new subsidies for supporting coal-fired power plants.81 
The Trump administration justifies its proposed payments to 
nuclear power plants and coal-fired power plants under the 
guise of compensation for their unique reliability and resiliency 
attributes.82 
State ZEC programs and the Trump administration’s pro-
posals are motivated by very different concerns and based on 
very different degrees of data and analysis. The New York Pub-
lic Service Commission (New York PSC), for example, imple-
mented ZECs as part of a comprehensive effort to redesign the 
state’s electricity sector.83 The Commission determined that it 
would be impossible to achieve New York’s climate policy goals 
if three in-state nuclear power plants retired early because 
carbon-emitting natural-gas-fired power plants would likely re-
place the carbon-free generation from the nuclear facilities.84 
 
 80. See S.B. 2814, 99th Gen. Assemb. (Ill. 2016) (citing the purpose of the zero 
emission credit program). 
 81. Peter Maloney, Feud of the Year: Nuclear and Coal Vs. Competitive 
Markets, UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/feud-of-the-
year-nuclear-and-coal-vs-competitive-markets/508266/ [https://perma.cc/K2YS-SBJ9] 
(“Companion bills in Ohio, HB 239 and SB 155, would provide perpetual subsidies 
for two coal-fired plants: the 1,100 MW Kyger Creek in Cheshire and the 1,300 
MW Clifty Creek in Madison, Indiana jointly owned by a group of utilities that 
includes American Electric Power, FirstEnergy and Duke Energy.”). 
 82. Letter from Rick Perry, Sec’y, Dep’t of Energy, to Neil Chatterjee et al., 
Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n (Sept. 28, 2017), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017 
/09/f37/Secretary%20Rick%20Perry%27s%20Letter%20to%20the%20Federal%20 
Energy%20Regulatory%20Commission.pdf [https://perma.cc/QY7N-HX88]. For 
examples of the opposition to the Department of Energy proposal, see Gavin Bade, 
‘FERC Did Its Job:’ Former Regulators, Lawyers Laud DOE NOPR Rejection, 
UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ferc-did-its-job-
former-regulators-lawyers-laud-doe-nopr-rejection/514394/ [https://perma.cc/KB6U 
-GGCL]; Joshua S. Hill, US Energy Industry Associations Urge FERC to Reject 
DOE Proposal to Subsidize Coal & Nuclear, CLEANTECHNICA (Nov. 8, 2017), 
https://cleantechnica.com/2017/11/08/us-energy-industry-associations-urge-ferc-
reject-doe-proposal-subsidise-coal-nuclear/ [https://perma.cc/5XTL-QRGM]; David 
Roberts, Rick Perry’s Plan to Subsidize Coal and Nuclear Plants Is Bonkers, VOX 
(Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/10/4/16407278 
/rick-perry-doe-plan-coal-nuclear-energy-markets [https://perma.cc/HX2E-F4GP]. 
 83. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Case No. 15-E-0302, at 3, 13–
14 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n Aug. 1, 2016), http://documents.dps.ny.gov/public/ 
Common/ViewDoc.aspx?DocRefId=%7b44C5D5B8-14C3-4F32-8399-F5487D6D8F 
E8%7d [https://perma.cc/4RRK-TZZY] [hereinafter N.Y. Clean Energy Standard 
Order]. 
 84. Id. at 19 (“Based on current market conditions, losing the carbon-free 
attributes of this generation before the development of new renewable resources 
between now and 2030, would undoubtedly result in significantly increased air 
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In contrast, the Trump administration has provided little 
defensible evidence that reliability concerns justify its pro-
posals.85 Reliability is a concern in some areas of the country, 
but one that system operators, market participants, and fed-
eral regulators generally agree is manageable as older coal and 
nuclear plants retire.86 Furthermore, the Trump administra-
tion’s narrow definitions of resiliency and ability to qualify for 
payments exclude other strategies for maintaining system reli-
ability such as energy storage, expanded transmission systems, 
demand response, and other existing generation options. 
While these market interventions are fundamentally 
different in many respects, they share similarities that are im-
portant for the future trajectory of the electricity sector. State 
ZEC programs and federal proposals to subsidize coal and nu-
clear plants each seek to rescue existing power plants that are 
no longer competitive due primarily to low natural gas prices.87 
Efforts to ensure the profitability of specific power plants 
effectively create a hybrid version of the rate-setting model 
that states rejected when they moved to break up the vertically 
integrated electric monopolies in the first place. 
The following subsections describe ZECs and the Trump 
administration proposals in greater detail, identifying key ele-
ments of each strategy. 
 
emissions due to heavier reliance on existing fossil-fueled plants or the 
construction of new gas plants to replace the supplanted energy.”). 
 85. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 76 (failing to find evidence 
that grid reliability required subsidizing economically vulnerable coal-fired power 
plants). 
 86. See Jared Anderson, PJM Finds FirstEnergy Nuclear Plants Can Retire 
Without Threatening Reliability, S&P GLOBAL PLATTS (Apr. 30, 2018), 
https://www.spglobal.com/platts/en/market-insights/latest-news/electric-power/043 
018-pjm-finds-firstenergy-nuclear-plants-can-retire-without-threatening-reliability 
[https://perma.cc/T5PQ-3AZ8]; Rachel Fakhry & Toba Pearlman, Analysis: Illinois 
Does Not Need the Dynegy-Vistra Fleet, NRDC (May 16, 2018), https://www. 
nrdc.org/experts/rachel-fakhry/analysis-illinois-does-not-need-dynegy-vistra-fleet 
[https://perma.cc/T8CB-RW2Z]. See generally MARK SPECHT & LAURA WISLAND, 
UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, TURNING DOWN THE GAS IN CALIFORNIA, 
TECHNICAL APP. (Aug. 2018), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/ 
2018/08/Turn-Down-Technical-Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/FF32-GYE2]. 
 87. See Jennifer A. Dlouhy, Trump Prepares Lifeline for Money-Losing Coal 
Plants, BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2018-06-01/trump-said-to-grant-lifeline-to-money-losing-coal-power-plants-jhv94ghl 
[https://perma.cc/5MRT-YMPH]; see also Jessica Bayles, New York’s New Renew-
able Energy Standard, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.natlaw 
review.com/article/new-york-s-new-renewable-energy-standard [https://perma.cc/ 
5R3W-GMTE]. 
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A. State Efforts to Support Existing Nuclear Generation 
The New York PSC implemented the first ZEC program in 
2016 as part of the state’s Clean Energy Standard.88 The pro-
gram requires that load-serving entities (i.e., entities delivering 
electricity to retail consumers in the state) purchase ZECs from 
three nuclear power plants in the state.89 
The Commission justified the ZEC requirements as the 
only alternative to realistically meet the state’s greenhouse gas 
emission reduction targets. The New York PSC estimates a $4 
billion benefit in the first two years of the ZEC program, com-
pared to a cost of $1 billion.90 According to the Commission, 
neither energy efficiency improvements nor increased renewa-
ble energy generation could replace the zero-carbon generation 
provided by the state’s existing nuclear power plants.91 
The state’s climate goals are not the sole motivation be-
hind the ZEC requirements, however. The Clean Energy Stan-
dard also cites “maintaining existing jobs” as another benefit of 
 
 88. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 1. In addition to 
ZECs, the Clean Energy Standard established a renewable energy target of fifty 
percent by 2030. Id. at 76. 
 89. REC and ZEC Purchasers, N.Y. STATE ENERGY RES. & DEV. AUTH., 
https://www.nyserda.ny.gov/All-Programs/Programs/Clean-Energy-Standard/REC 
-and-ZEC-Purchasers (last visited Jan. 21, 2018) [https://perma.cc/7KE8-C26F]. 
The number of ZECs are capped at the historic generation of the state’s 
FitzPatrick, Ginna, and Nine Mile Point nuclear facilities. N.Y. Clean Energy 
Standard Order, supra note 83, at 145. 
 90. Jeffrey Tomich & Saqib Rahim, Exelon Girds for Challenges to Cuomo’s 
N.Y. Nuclear Subsidy, E&E NEWS (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.eenews.net/ 
stories/1060041817 [https://perma.cc/73Q6-7AF5] (citing figures from the July 8, 
2016 New York PSC proposal). 
 91. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 126–27 (“[I]t is 
simply unrealistic to assume that sufficient additional energy efficiency measures 
could be identified and implemented in time to offset the 27.6 million MWh of 
zero-emissions nuclear power that would need to be replaced per year . . . . As in 
the case of energy efficiency, it is not realistic to assume that sufficient additional 
renewable resources at a reasonable price or perhaps any price could be identified 
and implemented in sufficient time to offset the 27.6 million MWh of zero-
emissions nuclear power per year.”). 
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the new requirements.92 According to a 2017 report, New York 
has 110,582 jobs in the energy efficiency sector.93 
New York’s ZEC program has not been without contro-
versy. Opponents of the New York ZEC program brought suit, 
citing the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2016 decision Hughes v. Talen, 
to argue that the New York approach was preempted by the 
Federal Power Act.94 The Hughes Court considered a Maryland 
law that aimed to incentivize construction of a new natural-
gas-fired power plant within the state.95 The Court determined 
that the Federal Power Act preempted the state law because 
Maryland relied on a “contract for differences” approach to in-
centivize construction of the new facility.96 Maryland commit-
ted to subsidizing the new power plant, but the prices paid to 
the new facility were tied directly to the PJM capacity market 
clearing prices.97 The Supreme Court found that this direct 
link amounted to Maryland attempting to govern interstate, 
wholesale electricity transactions—a realm exclusively reserv-
ed for FERC.98 
Rather than linking ZEC prices directly to NYISO market 
prices, the New York approach relies on the federal govern-
ment’s social cost of carbon for pricing the ZECs.99 Illinois and 
Connecticut subsequently implemented their own versions of 
ZEC requirements.100 New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are 
considering following suit by implementing their own subsidy 
programs for existing nuclear units.101 
 
 92. Id. at 7, 46–47. The ZEC requirements have been criticized due to the cost 
per protected job. One estimate puts the cost per job at $303,000, paid by New 
York’s ratepayers. Michael Kuser, NY Legislators Frustrated by Lack of Answers 
at ZEC Hearing, RTO INSIDER (Mar. 7, 2017), https://www.rtoinsider.com/cuomo-
administration-nuclear-plants-zecs-hearing-39787/ [https://perma.cc/EM7E-3RJS]. 
 93. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 2017 U.S. ENERGY AND JOBS REPORT STATE 
CHARTS 194 (2017), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/01/f34/2017%20US%20 
Energy%20and%20Jobs%20Report%20State%20Charts%202_0.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/EM7E-3RJS]. 
 94. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 2018). 
 95. Hughes v. Talen, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294 (2016). 
 96. Id. at 1297. 
 97. Id. at 1298. 
 98. Id. 
 99. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 150. 
 100. Illinois’ Future Energy Jobs Act, 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 3855/1-75(d-5)(1) 
(2018); 2017 Conn. Acts 17-3 (Spec. Sess.). 
 101. Scott DiSavino, N.J. Governor Christie Eyes Nuclear Power Subsidies, 
Sparks Criticism, U.S. NEWS (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.usnews.com/news 
/us/articles/2017-12-08/nj-governor-christie-eyes-nuclear-power-subsidies-sparks-
criticism [https://perma.cc/F2TF-T7S3]. 
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The New York and Illinois ZEC requirements have each 
survived court challenges.102 In both cases, opponents of the 
ZEC approach presented three main arguments against the 
state program: (1) the ZEC programs interfere with FERC’s ex-
clusive jurisdiction over wholesale sales by “effectively replac-
ing” the FERC-regulated wholesale price, (2) the programs dis-
tort FERC-regulated market outcomes and thus conflict with 
FERC’s exclusive jurisdiction, and (3) the discriminatory na-
ture of the programs violates the dormant Commerce 
Clause.103 The Second and Seventh Circuits found that the 
New York and Illinois ZEC programs, respectively, were 
sufficiently different from the facts in Hughes because there 
was no direct link between the state programs and the 
wholesale RTO markets.104 
B. Federal Efforts to Support Existing Coal and Nuclear 
Generation 
The Department of Energy took a different tack on the nu-
clear retirement issue, proposing subsidies for nuclear and 
coal-fired power plants.105 The Department of Energy’s 2017 
Proposed Grid Resiliency Rule instructed FERC to consider 
compensating these two categories of facilities for their reliabil-
ity and resiliency attributes.106 The proposal defined resiliency 
attributes as the ability to store fuel on-site, thus excluding 
natural gas and renewable energy facilities.107 
The proposed rule was subject to widespread criticism.108 
As already noted, the rule was not necessary to ensure grid 
 
 102. Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 906 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2018); Elec. 
Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, 904 F.3d 518 (7th Cir. 2018). 
 103. Star, 904 F.3d at 522; Zibelman, 906 F.3d at 46. 
 104. Zibelman, 906 F.3d at 51–52; Star, 904 F.3d at 523–24. 
 105. See Devin Henry, Energy Dept. Report Aims to Boost Coal, Nuclear Power, 
HILL (Aug. 23, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/energy-environment/347730-energy-
dept-report-aims-to-boost-coal-nuclear-power [https://perma.cc/DH84-7U7M]; U.S. 
DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 76. 
 106. Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule, 18 C.F.R. pt. 35 (2017). The Department of 
Energy claimed that the proposed rule would “protect the American people from 
energy outages expected to result from the loss of this fuel-secure generation.” Id. 
at 46941. The Department of Energy has authority to propose rules that FERC 
must then consider. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Gavin Bade, Moniz on DOE NOPR: ‘No Identification of a Public Good,’ 
UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 12, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/moniz-on-doe-nopr-
no-identification-of-a-public-good/514700/ [https://perma.cc/C4TR-563F] (quoting 
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reliability. Analysis of the 2014 polar vortex—an event that 
Energy Secretary Perry cited as evidence of the need for a grid 
resiliency rule—showed that coal-fired power plants did not 
perform consistently during the low temperatures.109 More re-
cently, electricity grids remained online during a week-long pe-
riod of low temperatures in January 2018.110 Further under-
mining the Department of Energy’s rationale for the proposed 
rule, “coal-fired facilities accounted for nearly half of all forced 
outages in PJM” during the January 2018 cold snap, and a 
nuclear power plant in ISO-NE was removed from service.111 
Even the Department of Energy’s own analysis of the reliability 
needs of the electricity grid, published one month prior to the 
release of the proposed rule, did not conclude that continued 
operation of coal-fired power plants was necessary for system 
reliability.112 
FERC declined to pursue the Department of Energy’s pro-
posed price supports.113 Nevertheless, the Department of Ener-
gy’s proposed rule remains an important signal regarding the 
future trajectory of electricity markets. At least one commis-
sioner indicated that he was willing to support the proposed 
rule, and FERC committed to continue examining reliability 
concerns.114 
 
former Department of Energy Secretary Ernest Moniz as saying there was “no 
identification of a public good that merited putting the extra cost on the system”); 
Steven Mufson, Bipartisan Group of Former FERC Commissioners Rejects Energy 




 109. See PJM, ANALYSIS OF OPERATIONAL EVENTS AND MARKET IMPACTS 




 110. Susan Miller, 2018 Begins with Record Cold, as Arctic Weather Puts Some 
New Year’s Plans on Ice, USA TODAY (Jan. 1, 2018, 1:39 AM), https://www.usa 
today.com/story/news/2018/01/01/2018-begins-record-cold-arctic-weather-puts-some 
-new-years-plans-ice/993997001/ [https://perma.cc/E565-6N9Z]. 
 111. Order Terminating Rulemaking Proceeding, Initiating New Proceedings, 
& Establishing Additional Procedures re Grid Reliability & Resilience Pricing, 
162 FERC ¶ 61,012, at 3 (2018) (Glick, Comm’r, concurring) [hereinafter Grid 
Reliability and Resilience Pricing]. 
 112. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 76. 
 113. Grid Reliability & Resilience Pricing, supra note 111. 
 114. Id. at 17; Julia Pyper, DOE Official: Agency ‘Confident’ FERC Will 
Approve a Coal, Nuclear Pricing Rule, GREENTECH MEDIA (Nov. 14, 2017), https:// 
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After FERC rejected the Department of Energy proposal, 
the Trump administration reframed the issue as a grid emer-
gency and a national security concern, invoking provisions of 
the Federal Power Act and Defense Production Act.115 A leaked 
White House memorandum argued that natural gas and petro-
leum are more vulnerable to national security threats than nu-
clear and coal because pipelines could be easily disrupted by 
cyber or physical attacks.116 According to the memorandum, 
fuel diversity can help combat this vulnerability. In particular, 
the memorandum argues that coal and nuclear facilities are 
less likely to have fuel supply issues, are more capable of en-
suring consistent generation, and are capable of storing fuel on-
site.117 
According to the memorandum, the retirement of coal and 
nuclear plants “undermin[es] the security of the electric power 
system because the system’s resilience depends upon those re-
sources.”118 In addition to arguing for the resiliency benefits of 
coal and nuclear power, the memorandum emphasizes that nu-
clear provides strategic and security benefits to the United 
States because of the military’s dependence upon the civilian 
nuclear industry to support military and strategic uses of nu-
clear.119 
As of the publication of this Article, the Trump administra-
tion has not released an official order instructing the Depart-
ment of Energy to pursue these strategies. Nonetheless, Secre-
tary Perry adopted the national security framing in his advocacy 
for subsidizing coal and nuclear facilities and testified before 
Congress that market intervention to support economically vul-
 
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/doe-confident-ferc-will-dutifully-consider-
adopt-coal-nuclear-rule [https://perma.cc/4Q7A-ZS9V] (stating interim FERC 
Chairman, Neil Chatterjee, has said he is “sympathetic” to the rule). But see 
Bipartisan Former FERC Commissioners, Comment Letter on Proposed Grid 
Resiliency Pricing Rule (Oct. 19, 2017), https://s3.amazonaws.com/dive_static/pay 
chek/Comments_of_BFFC_Docket_RM18-1_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/24H8-FU97]. 
 115. Dlouhy, supra note 87. 
 116. Draft Addendum in Support of Dep’t of Energy Action 8–9 (May 29, 2018), 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/4491203-Grid-Memo.html [https://perma.cc/ 
RH8H-VJR4]. 
 117. Id. at 11–12. 
 118. Id. at 2. 
 119. Id. at 21. 
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nerable coal and nuclear power plants “is exactly what has to 
happen.”120 
Dismissing the federal effort due to the lack of evidence to 
support its purported purpose risks obscuring the underlying 
point that shifting markets elicit political responses.121 The 
Trump administration’s attempts to frame the debate around 
issues of grid reliability and affordability mask the value judg-
ments underlying state and federal responses to changing mar-
ket conditions. These are proxy battles over core issues of state 
autonomy, economic development, responses to climate change 
and other environmental challenges, fuel choices, and the fu-
ture trajectory of the electric grid. 
III. RETHINKING COMPETITION IN TRADITIONALLY REGULATED 
STATES 
Traditionally regulated states are not immune to the fac-
tors leading restructured states to reconsider the role of compe-
tition. Notably, some of the same challenges that led states to 
initially consider restructuring are present in today’s tradition-
ally regulated states.122 Low natural gas prices and flat de-
mand growth have resulted in coal plant retirements—and 
thus job losses—in these states, as well.123 Falling prices for re-
newable energy technologies and demands for more choice in 
electricity generation by residential and commercial stakehold-
ers have led some of these states to also reconsider the role of 
competition in their electricity sectors. 
Traditionally regulated states have more options to soften 
the impacts and extend the transition period by setting rates 
that avoid stranded assets and unwanted plant closures. 
Therefore, if state policy requires a reduction in greenhouse gas 
 
 120. Gavin Bade, Perry: Emergency Order for Coal, Nukes Is ‘Exactly What Has 
to Happen’, UTIL. DIVE (Apr. 12, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/perry-
emergency-order-for-coal-nukes-is-exactly-what-has-to-happen/521250/ [https:// 
perma.cc/LWH7-F3NS]. 
 121. See David B. Spence, Naïve Energy Markets, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 973, 
981 (2017) (explaining that politics and subsequent statutes passed have greatly 
influenced the energy market over the years). 
 122. See Ethan Howland, The Four Greatest Challenges Utilities Face in 2014, 
UTIL. DIVE (Dec. 9, 2013), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/the-four-greatest-
challenges-utilities-face-in-2014/202574/ [https://perma.cc/9T9S-CXDF]. 
 123. Drew Haerer & Lincoln Pratson, Employment Trends in the U.S. 
Electricity Sector, 2008–2012, 82 ENERGY POL’Y 85 (2015) (finding that the coal 
industry lost almost fifty thousand jobs during the five-year study period). 
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emissions and accepts that maintaining existing nuclear power 
plants is a cost-effective tool for helping the state achieve that 
goal, the PUC may set rates that ensure the economic viability 
of the in-state fleet of nuclear units. By contrast, PUCs in com-
petitive markets have limited options for doing so (e.g., approv-
ing higher priced contracts between load-serving entities and 
nuclear facilities). 
Despite the ability to achieve some policy goals via rate 
setting, some traditionally regulated states are grappling with 
the same challenges of overinvestment and poor risk manage-
ment that plagued the sector in the 1970s and 1980s.124 The 
most glaring examples come from South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Mississippi. South Carolina is grappling with a financial fallout 
after the recent cancellation of the VC Summer nuclear project 
in the state. The two lead utilities had invested approximately 
$9 billion in the project by the time of cancellation.125 Southern 
Company will continue building two new nuclear units at its 
Plant Vogtle site in Georgia, despite the fact that the project is 
nearly five years behind schedule and the projected cost is $27 
billion—almost twice the original projected cost.126 Mississippi 
Power, a Southern Company subsidiary, opted not to complete 
the coal gasification portion of the Kemper County project that 
was supposed to gasify coal mined on-site and then capture 65 
percent of the carbon emissions.127 Shareholders will bear the 
majority of the costs, but ratepayers will still pay $2.5 billion 
for what is now a 582 MW natural-gas-fired plant, far exceed-
ing the cost of conventional natural gas combined-cycle 
units.128 
 
 124. See, e.g., Kristi E. Swartz, Skyrocketing Costs Bury Southern Co., E&E 
NEWS: ENERGYWIRE (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060050444 
[https://perma.cc/3VNL-TYDS] (discussing rate increases in Mississippi and 
Georgia). 
 125. Brad Plumer, U.S. Nuclear Comeback Stalls as Two Reactors Are 
Abandoned, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/31/ 
climate/nuclear-power-project-canceled-in-south-carolina.html [https://perma.cc/ 
2PHS-MYZJ]. 
 126. See Robert Walton, Vogtle Nuclear Construction to Continue, Southern Co. 
Says, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/vogtle-nuclear 
-construction-to-continue-southern-co-says/503977/ [https://perma.cc/WS87-XJKP]. 
 127. Megan Geuss, $7.5 Billion Kemper Power Plant Suspends Coal 
Gasification, ARS TECHNICA (June 28, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/information-
technology/2017/06/7-5-billion-kemper-power-plant-suspends-coal-gasification/ 
[https://perma.cc/VVP5-HR9E]. 
 128. David Wagman, The Three Factors That Doomed Kemper County IGCC, 
IEEE SPECTRUM (June 30, 2017), https://spectrum.ieee.org/energywise/energy/ 
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All three states have laws allowing utilities to charge rate-
payers during the construction phase for high-cost, high-risk 
projects.129 These laws—generally referred to as “Construction 
Work In Progress,” or CWIP, shift risks associated with the 
projects from the utilities and their investors to ratepayers, 
risks with which ratepayers in South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Mississippi are now all too familiar.130 As of December 2018, 
the South Carolina state legislature is going so far as to pro-
pose reversal of the cost recovery allowed by the state’s Base-
load Review Act in the aftermath of the canceled construction 
of two new nuclear units at the VC Summer facility.131 
Numerous factors contributed to the approval of CWIP cost 
recovery for the Kemper County, Vogtle, and VC Summer proj-
ects. Each project was justified in part by the risk of high gas 
prices, the prospect of federal climate policy increasing costs for 
conventional fossil-fuel-fired generation, and expectations of 
high electricity demand.132 These factors did not materialize, 
thus calling into question the robustness of the risk assess-
ments and the PUCs’ willingness to approve expensive long-
term projects to hedge these risks.133 The unforeseen shifts in 
energy markets also had direct impacts on the current eco-
nomics of the projects.134 For example, had Congress adopted 
federal climate legislation and natural gas prices remained 
high, the South Carolina utilities may have decided to proceed 
with the VC Summer project despite the cost overruns. The VC 
 
fossil-fuels/the-three-factors-that-doomed-kemper-county-igcc [https://perma.cc/ 
2Z23-8T48]. In 2016, the Energy Information Administration estimated that the 
construction cost of a conventional natural gas combined cycle power plant was 
$978/kw. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES FOR UTILITY 
SCALE ELECTRICITY GENERATING PLANTS 7 (2016), https://www.eia.gov/analysis 
/studies/powerplants/capitalcost/pdf/capcost_assumption.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
2NC4-G448]. At that price, the cost of constructing a conventional 582 MW facility 
would be approximately $570 million. 
 129. Base Load Review Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-33-210 (2017); MISS. CODE 
ANN. § 77-3-101 (2018); Georgia Nuclear Energy Financing Act, GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 46-2-25 (2018). 
 130. See Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13, at 848. 
 131. Avery G. Wilks, SCE&G ‘Unlikely’ to Go Bankrupt if Rates Slashed After 
Nuclear Debacle, Reports Says, STATE (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.thestate.com/ 
news/politics-government/article195667359.html [https://perma.cc/Y9WG-QMXF]. 
 132. See Monast, supra note 27, at 149–56 (discussing the risk hedging allowed 
by the PUC decisions as a positive development in PUCs interpreting their “least 
cost” mandates broadly enough to consider the risk of higher costs associated with 
future environmental regulations). 
 133. See, e.g., Plumer, supra note 125. 
 134. Id. 
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Summer and Vogtle projects were also impacted by the unan-
ticipated bankruptcy of Westinghouse, the lead contractor for 
construction of the projects and the developer of the reactor de-
sign.135 
Critics of vertically integrated utilities may view the VC 
Summer, Vogtle, and Kemper projects as expected outcomes 
when there is a lack of competitive pressures restraining utili-
ties’ willingness to undertake risky projects. There is a reason 
that construction of the nation’s new nuclear units was initi-
ated in traditionally regulated states rather than restructured 
states. Companies operating in competitive markets would not 
invest in projects with such long construction times and high 
construction costs. CWIP does not eliminate risk for the utility. 
Southern Company shareholders are bearing approximately 
$6.4 billion of the cost of the gasification portion of the Kemper 
County facility that Mississippi Power now says it will not op-
erate due to technical malfunctions and the need for additional 
expenditures that it would not be able to recover through 
rates.136 The challenges associated with stranded assets and 
cost overruns may extend beyond these high-profile examples, 
depending on how the electricity sector evolves.137 
Without diminishing the validity of these critiques, the ex-
perimentation between different state regulatory approaches is 
also demonstrating the benefits of the cost-of-service approach 
in an uncertain investment climate. If state policy calls for re-
ductions in greenhouse gas emissions and the PUC accepts that 
keeping existing nuclear facilities online is a cost-effective 
strategy for achieving the emissions goal, the commission can 
 
 135. See Tom Hals & Emily Flitter, How Two Cutting Edge U.S. Nuclear 




 136. See Darrell Proctor, Regulators Back Settlement for Costs of Failed 
Kemper IGCC Project, POWER (Feb. 6, 2018), http://www.powermag.com/ 
regulators-back-settlement-for-costs-of-failed-kemper-igcc-project/ [https://perma. 
cc/8ANG-A4FY]; Wagman, supra note 128. 
 137. See, e.g., Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Costs and Grid 
Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 645, 663 (2017) (discussing the relationship 
between decarbonization policies and stranded assets); see also JOACHIM SEEL ET 
AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., IMPACTS OF HIGH VARIABLE RENEWABLE 
ENERGY FUTURES ON WHOLESALE ELECTRICITY PRICES, AND ON ELECTRIC-
SECTOR DECISION MAKING (2018), https://emp.lbl.gov/publications/impacts-high-
variable-renewable [https://perma.cc/WSY3-5ZZF] (considering the impact of high 
versus low penetration of variable renewable energy on the electricity grid). 
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set rates that allow the nuclear facility to continue operating. 
The PUC may also adjust rates, including via CWIP rate recov-
ery if allowed by state law, to facilitate investments in innova-
tive technologies—the types of projects that may be necessary 
if the nation is to achieve the aggressive level of emission re-
ductions needed to mitigate catastrophic climate change—that 
are less likely to occur without certainty regarding cost recov-
ery.138 Risky innovative energy projects like nuclear energy, 
carbon capture and storage, and offshore wind corridors are 
important elements of realizing a low-carbon energy future, 
and cost recovery is an important aspect of promoting these 
technologies.139 Cost recovery through cost-of-service rate set-
ting is a mechanism for doing so.140 
Policymakers in some traditionally regulated states are 
seeking a new balance between competition and monopoly to 
respond to recent developments in electricity markets and con-
sumer demands. Some states are seeking to retain the monop-
oly structure while creating limited openings for third parties 
to compete with utilities, and others are considering new ef-
forts to break up electric utility monopolies. The remainder of 
this section focuses on three such examples: North Carolina’s 
new competitive procurement process for solar energy genera-
tion, Nevada’s law allowing energy users to exit the monopoly’s 
exclusive service territory, and Nevada’s ballot measure on re-
structuring.141 
A. Competitive Procurement for Renewable Energy 
Generation 
A recent North Carolina statute amending the state’s ap-
proach to solar energy demonstrates how a state may create 
 
 138. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13, at 848. CWIP as a mechanism is not the 
problem. The problem is the disincentive to fully vet risks after the initial decision 
to approve CWIP recovery, a lack of oversight that may follow granting of the 
CWIP rate recovery, and placing the costs and risks on a relatively small group of 
ratepayers. Monast & Adair, supra note 44. 
 139. S. Pacala & R. Socolow, Stabilization Wedges: Solving the Climate 
Problem for the Next 50 Years with Current Technologies, 305 SCIENCE 968 (2004) 
(identifying key available technologies for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions). 
 140. Boyd & Carlson, supra note 13. 
 141. See 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 192; Assemb. B. 452, 79th Sess. (Nev. 2017). 
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new opportunities for competition without rejecting the monop-
oly-utility model.142 
Three factors led to North Carolina’s ranking as the state 
with the second largest amount of installed solar capacity in 
the country.143 The first contributing factor is the federal Pub-
lic Utilities Regulatory Policy Act (PURPA).144 Like the laws in 
other traditionally regulated states, PURPA requires North 
Carolina’s vertically integrated utilities to purchase electricity 
generated at “qualifying facilities” or QFs (generally renewable 
energy or combined heat and power facilities with a capacity 
factor of less than 80 MW) at the utility’s avoided cost (the 
amount the utility would otherwise spend to generate or pro-
cure the same amount of power).145 
The second factor is the state’s Renewable Energy and En-
ergy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (“REPS”), which requires 
that 12.5 percent of electricity sales by the state’s regulated 
utilities be generated by renewable energy by 2021.146 The law 
included a specific requirement that a minimum of 0.2 percent 
of generation should come from solar energy by 2018.147 
The third factor is a historical holdover. After enactment of 
PURPA, but prior to the establishment of the state’s REPS, the 
NC Utilities Commission developed a standardized contract 
 
 142. See 2017 N.C. Sess. Laws 192. 
 143. North Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar Facilities Than Any 
Other State, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.eia.gov/today 
inenergy/detail.php?id=27632 [https://perma.cc/YR8M-WUTU] [hereinafter North 
Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar]. 
 144. Id. (As of 2016, “1,173 MW, or 92%, of [North Carolina’s] 1,271 MW 
utility-scale PV capacity is certified to have qualifying facility (QF) small power 
producer status under PURPA, which is more than any state in both absolute and 
percentage terms.”). 
 145. 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(e)(1) (2012). “Avoided costs means the incremental 
costs to an electric utility of electric energy or capacity or both which, but for the 
purchase from the qualifying facility or qualifying facilities, such utility would 
generate itself or purchase from another source.” 18 C.F.R. § 292.101 (2018). 
 146. Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Portfolio Standard (REPS), N.C. 
GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(b)(1) (2017). At the time of passage, the state had two 
vertically integrated investor-owned utilities (IOUs): Duke Energy and Progress 
Energy. The two firms subsequently merged and now operate as a single company 
with two distinct service territories: Duke Energy Carolinas and Duke Energy 
Progress. Merger of Progress Energy and Duke Energy Created Largest U.S. 
Electric Utility, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Aug. 22, 2012), https://www.eia.gov/ 
todayinenergy/detail.php?id=7650 [https://perma.cc/W5WQ-FBWS]. 
 147. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-133.8(d). 
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that allowed QFs at 5 MW or less to enter into fifteen-year con-
tracts for a fixed avoided-cost rate.148 
Together, these factors led to dramatic growth in 5 MW so-
lar energy facilities, with the majority located in the eastern 
part of the state where land is relatively inexpensive but far 
away from the areas of higher electricity demand.149 The utili-
ties found themselves with a queue of five hundred projects 
awaiting connection to the grid with little (or no) control over 
location or timing of generation.150 Furthermore, the fifteen-
year contracts locked in prices set at the avoided cost at the 
time of construction.151 Because prices for solar panels have 
fallen significantly since 2008, and the overall avoided cost has 
decreased as Duke Energy shifted to lower-cost natural gas, 
utility executives have complained that the standardized con-
tract resulted in higher prices for ratepayers.152 
There are compelling reasons to offer long-term contracts 
for renewable energy, as is standard practice in competitive 
electricity markets.153 Because there are no fuel costs and low 
maintenance costs, the primary cost for renewable energy fa-
cilities is in the construction phase.154 Thus, renewable facili-
ties provide price certainty, which itself has value for a utility’s 
generation mix.155 Although there is short-term variation in 
power output (e.g., decreased solar generation output during 
cloudy days), there is general certainty regarding expected av-
 
 148. North Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar, supra note 143. 
 149. See Utility-Scale Solar Powers North Carolina’s Economy, TERRASMART 
(May 5, 2017), http://www.terrasmart.com/utility-scale-solar-powers-north-carolinas 
-economy/ [https://perma.cc/Z43Y-CLBW]. 
 150. John Downey, New Complaints Contend Duke Energy Is Stalling Grid 
Connections for Solar Projects, TRIANGLE BUS. J. (June 19, 2017), https://www.biz 
journals.com/triangle/news/2017/06/19/new-complaints-contend-duke-stalling-grid 
.html [https://perma.cc/HB65-KGKB]. 
 151. North Carolina Has More PURPA-Qualifying Solar, supra note 143. 
 152. Bruce Chapman, Duke Energy Says Solar Power Will Cost N.C. Customers 
$1 Billion Too Much, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.charlotte 
observer.com/news/local/article134736169.html [https://perma.cc/BL67-EHRS]. 
 153. Leah B. Chacon, Comment, Long-Term Contracting the Way to Renewable 
Energy Investment: Lessons from Brazil Applied to the United States, 62 EMORY 
L.J. 1563 (2013). 
 154. Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, UNION OF CONCERNED 
SCIENTISTS (Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-
energy/barriers-to-renewable-energy [perma.cc/7TW2-KJ3K]. 
 155. Benefits of Renewable Energy Use, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/renewable-energy/public-
benefits-of-renewable-power [https://perma.cc/Y95C-BPDN]. 
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erage generation.156 Long-term contracts also provide price cer-
tainty for the companies constructing the solar facilities by al-
lowing access to capital at lower interest rates.157 Furthermore, 
renewable energy contracts can help utilities meet the shifting 
demands of its ratepayers. North Carolina, like numerous 
other states, aims to attract new employers whose criteria for 
site selection include access to clean energy.158 
The utility may appreciate these factors, but they also run 
counter to the firm’s primary means of delivering value to its 
shareholders. Cost-of-service ratemaking—ensuring that rates 
are set at a level that allows the firm to recover the amount 
invested in infrastructure as well as a rate of return on those 
investments—rewards capital investments by the utility.159 
Electricity purchased from independent power producers is 
generally passed on to ratepayers, but utilities do not generally 
earn a rate of return on those expenditures.160 
PURPA, the state REPS, and the standardized contract 
served as exogenous factors that motivated the utility to seek 
changes to the law. A lengthy stakeholder process resulted in 
passage of the Competitive Energy Solutions for North Caro-
lina Act (HB 589).161 The new law includes a competitive pro-
curement process for solar generation,162 limited opportunities 
for third-party leasing,163 a new community solar program,164 a 
 
 156. Barriers to Renewable Energy Technologies, supra note 154. 
 157. Chacon, supra note 153, at 1611. 
 158. See Sharon E. Burke, What City Has the Power to Woo Amazon?, SLATE 
(Jan. 26, 2018), https://slate.com/technology/2018/01/what-city-has-the-best-
energy-policies-for-amazons-headquarters-search.html [https://perma.cc/3SWD-
GZLY]. 
 159. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the 
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 457 (2005). 
 160. Electric utilities generally earn a rate of return for capital expenditures. 
See, e.g., Larry B. Parker et al., Clean Air Act Allowance Trading, 21 ENVTL. L. 
2021, 2054 (1991) (“Under traditional rate-of-return regulation, electric utilities 
are entitled to have their revenue requirements met by earning a rate-of-return 
on capital investments and by recovering necessary operating expenses.”). 
 161. Robert Walton, North Carolina Passes Solar Reform Bill with 18-Month 
Wind Moratorium, UTIL. DIVE (June 30, 2017), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/ 
north-carolina-passes-solar-reform-bill-with-18-month-wind-moratorium [https:// 
perma.cc/9MEY-RHX3]. 
 162. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.8 (2017). 
 163. HB 589 limits third-party leases the lesser of 1 MW or 100 percent of 
contract demand for nonresidential customers, 20 kW or 100 percent of estimated 
electrical demand for residential customers, and is intended only to offset the 
customer’s electrical consumption at that premises. § 62-126.3(14). Duke Energy 
may offer leases. § 62-126.5. 
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solar rebate program for residential customers,165 and revisions 
to the standardized contract and to net metering payments.166 
The law also provides additional opportunities for market en-
trants and includes provisions to respond to consumer demands 
for renewable energy. Major military installations, the Univer-
sity of North Carolina system, and other large customers may 
contract for renewable energy.167 
The key elements of HB 589’s competitive bidding process 
include a renewable energy target, a bidding process that al-
lows third parties and the utilities (or their subsidiaries not 
subject to rate regulation) to compete, and an independent 
monitor to ensure that the utility does not control the process 
by exerting market power. These provide a model for additional 
competition in traditionally regulated states.168 The North 
Carolina law identifies an aggressive target for new solar 
generation—2.6 GW of nameplate capacity (i.e., the maximum 
sustained output) over forty five months.169 Contracts for the 
new generation will be offered via a series of annual auctions 
monitored by an independent administrator.170 The bidding 
process allows Duke Energy to exert greater control over the 
location of new solar generation, presumably prioritizing gener-
ation that is closer to the population centers, areas with energy-
intensive companies such as manufacturing and data centers, 
or areas where the grid is able to accept additional generation. 
 
 164. § 62-126.8. A community solar facility is a “facility whose output is shared 
through subscriptions.” § 62-126.3(3). 
 165. § 62-155(f). 
 166. The law instructs Duke Energy to file revised net metering rates for 
utility commission approval for customers with leasing arrangements and those 
who own distributed solar installations. § 62-126.4. The final version of the law 
also imposed an eighteen-month moratorium on new wind generation. 2017 N.C. 
Sess. Laws 192, Part XIII. 
 167. § 62-159.2. Large customers are those with a contract demand equal to or 
greater than 1 MW at one site or more than 5 MW in aggregate from multiple 
service locations. § 62-159.2(a). HB 589 establishes generation limits as part of 
the direct contract provisions. § 62-159.2(c)–(d). 
 168. The N.C. Utilities Commission will identify the independent market 
monitor and promulgate rules governing the monitor’s role. § 62-110.8. 
 169. Id. Actual generation for a solar facility will be less than the nameplate 
capacity. Frequently Asked Questions: What Is the Difference Between Electricity 
Generation Capacity and Electricity Generation?, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=101&t=3 (last updated Feb. 14, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/PBA8-NEGR]. 
 170. § 62-110.8(d). 
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The law allows Duke Energy to develop up to 30 percent of 
the target capacity, with the remaining 70 percent reserved for 
development by independent companies.171 Duke Energy can 
also purchase facilities constructed by independent compa-
nies.172 
As part of the compromise, HB 589 codified new size limi-
tations for eligibility for the standardized contract. Initially, 
the size limit shifted from 5 MW to 1 MW.173 The limit for new 
facilities located in a specific utility service territory will shrink 
to 100 kW after installation of 100 MW of new projects.174 The 
law also amends the standardized contract by shortening the 
length of the fixed avoided-cost rate from fifteen years to ten 
years.175 
HB 589 does not supersede PURPA. Duke Energy must 
continue to purchase power from new QFs at the avoided-cost 
rate set by the state PUC, but the new law incentivizes inde-
pendent generators to participate in the competitive bidding 
process in lieu of the PURPA-mandated avoided-cost rates.176 
Under HB 589, winning bids will qualify for a twenty-year con-
tract for a fixed avoided-cost rate, compared to QFs which 
would be compensated at an avoided-cost rate that could vary 
over time.177 The first competitive solicitation closed in October 
2018 with winning bids to be announced in March 2019.178 
B. Allowing Consumers to Exit Utility Service 
Recent experience in Nevada demonstrates that large elec-
tricity consumers may be willing to pay fines to exit utility 
 
 171. § 62-110.8(b)(4). 
 172. Id. 
 173. § 62-156(b)(1). 
 174. Duke Energy has two service territories in North Carolina: Duke Energy 
Carolinas or Duke Energy Progress. 
 175. § 62-110.8(b)(1). 
 176. See 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (2012). 
 177. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-110.8(b)(3). These provisions do not apply to swine 
and poultry waste facilities. § 62-156(c). These facilities are eligible for terms 
longer than five years and expedited interconnection reviews. Id.; § 62-133.8(i)(4). 
 178. John Downey, Duke Energy Starts Up Bids and Rebates for Solar, 
CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (July 10, 2018), https://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/news/ 
2018/07/10/duke-energy-starts-up-bids-and-rebates-for-solar.html [https://perma.cc 
/M6KF-7DBZ]; Duke Energy Carolinas (DEC) Competitive Procurement of 
Renewable Energy Program (CPRE) Request for Proposal (RFP)—600 MW, 
ACCION GRP., https://decprerfp2018.accionpower.com/_rfp_1801/calendar.asp (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/2FSA-EVAN]. 
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service in exchange for greater access to renewable energy, 
creating both a cautionary tale for monopoly utilities and the 
motivation to be more responsive to shifting consumer de-
mands.179 In 2015, the Nevada PUC determined that three 
casinos could exit NV Energy’s system (the local monopoly 
utility) after paying an exit fee.180 The opportunity to do so was 
created by a 2001 law adopted in the aftermath of the Enron 
scandal.181 Until recently, no companies sought to exit the 
utility’s service and the PUC had not clarified the process for 
doing so.182 Switch, a data company located in Las Vegas, 
petitioned for the same opportunity as that afforded to the 
casinos.183 The Nevada PUC denied the petition, and Switch 
sued for damages and the right to exit the utility.184 The 
 
 179. See, e.g., Sean Whaley, MGM Resorts to Leave Nevada Power, Pay $86.9M 
Exit Fee, LAS VEGAS REV.-J. (May 19, 2016), https://www.reviewjournal.com/ 
business/energy/mgm-resorts-to-leave-nevada-power-pay-86-9m-exit-fee/ [https:// 
perma.cc/64CV-Q8NY]. The prospect of larger electricity purchasers exiting a 
utility’s service territory is not limited to the Nevada example. In December, for 
example, a Colorado electric cooperative requested that the Colorado PUC 
establish an exit charge to allow the co-op to leave the Tri-State Generation and 
Transmission Association. See Delta-Montrose Electric Association Files with PUC 
Seeking Just and Reasonable Exit Charge from Tri-State, DMEA (Dec. 6, 2018), 
http://www.dmea.com/content/delta-montrose-electric-association-files-puc-seeking 
-just-and-reasonable-exit-charge-tri [perma.cc/2TAD-U3M7]. The co-op justified 
its request on disputes regarding electricity rates and renewable energy 
investments. Id. 
 180. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., Order Approving Application of Wynn Las 
Vegas, LLC to Purchase Energy, Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a 
Provider of New Electric Resources, No. 15–05006 (Dec. 3, 2015); Pub. Util. 
Comm’n of Nev., Order Approving Application of Las Vegas Sands Corp. to 
Purchase Energy, Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a Provider of New 
electric Resources, No. 15–05002 (Dec. 3, 2015); Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., Order 
Approving Application of MGM Resorts International to Purchase Energy, 
Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a Provider of New Electric Resources, 
No. 15–05017 (Dec. 3, 2015); Herman K. Trabish, Major Las Vegas Resorts Get 
Price Tag for Grid Defection, UTIL. DIVE (Aug. 21, 2015), https://www.utility 
dive.com/news/major-las-vegas-resorts-get-price-tag-for-grid-defection/404372/ 
[https://perma.cc/Z42B-YG95]. 
 181. NEV. REV. STAT. § 704B (2017). 
 182. Kyle Roerink, Casinos Have Few Options After PUC Exit Decision, LAS 
VEGAS SUN (Dec. 3, 2015), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/dec/03/casinos-
have-few-options-after-puc-exit-decision/ [https://perma.cc/SJA9-WJCZ]. 
 183. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., Order Denying Application of Switch Ltd. to 
Purchase Energy, Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a Provider of New 
Electric Resources, No. 14–11007 (June 11, 2015). 
 184. Id.; Switch, Ltd. v. Nev. Power, 2:16-CV-01629 (D. Nev. July 12, 2016); 
Daniel Rothberg, Switch Sues PUC, NV Energy for $30 Million in Damages, 
Permission to Leave Utility, LAS VEGAS SUN (July 12, 2016), https://lasvegassun 
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companies and Nevada PUC Regulatory Operations staff 
reached a settlement shortly after Switch filed the lawsuit.185 
As part of the agreement, the utility agreed to construct a 100 
MW solar energy facility and provide 100 percent renewable 
power to the Switch facility via the new solar facility, geother-
mal power, and wind power.186 
On October 1, 2016, two major casinos departed NV Ener-
gy’s service territory, paying a collective $100 million exit fee 
and accepting the prospect of additional fees over a six-year pe-
riod.187 Together, these two companies accounted for approxi-
mately 6 percent of NV Energy’s electricity demand.188 
Utilities have obvious reasons to resist departure of large 
customers. Lower electricity demand means less need for gen-
eration. This, in turn, may leave power plants idle and utilities 
unable to pay off the facilities.189 Also, utility rates are volu-
metric to allow utilities to recover fixed costs. The more de-
mand for electricity, the lower the cost of each unit of electricity. 
Electricity demand may decrease due to efficiency improve-
ments or when large consumers meet their demand using inde-
pendent electricity, but the fixed costs remain constant. The 
utility’s remaining ratepayers may also face negative impacts, 
as the amount charged per unit of electricity must increase if 
utilities are to recover their costs.190 The Nevada PUC sought 
to mitigate rate impacts on the remaining ratepayers, include-
ing provisions allowing future fees as the true costs of the casi-
nos’ decisions become apparent. Although the fees may prevent 
rate increases, the lost revenue may leave the utility with 




 185. Pub. Util. Comm’n of Nev., Stipulation to the Application of Switch Ltd. to 
Purchase Energy, Capacity, and/or Ancillary Services from a Provider of New 
Electric Resources, No. 14–11007 (July 10, 2015). 
 186. Kyle Roerink, Switch and NV Energy Strike Deal to End Battle, LAS 
VEGAS SUN (July 14, 2015), https://lasvegassun.com/news/2015/jul/14/switch-and-
nv-energy-hash-deal-end-battle/ [https://perma.cc/KS9K-QQGX]. 
 187. Daniel Rothberg, MGM Resorts, Wynn to Stop Purchasing NV Energy 
Power Saturday, LAS VEGAS SUN (Sept. 30, 2016), https://lasvegassun.com/news/ 
2016/sep/30/mgm-resorts-wynn-stop-purchasing-nv-energy-power/ [https://perma.cc/ 
PMW4-A7MH]. 
 188. Id. 
 189. See Monast, supra note 27, at 172. 
 190. See id. 
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ergy projects and thus create incentives for other customers to 
follow the example of the casinos. 
C. Renewed Efforts to Break Up Vertically Integrated 
Monopolies 
Following the casinos’ exit, Nevadans approved the Energy 
Choice Initiative—a ballot measure to amend the Nevada Con-
stitution to “establish[ ] . . . an open, competitive retail electric 
energy market that prohibits the granting of monopolies and 
exclusive franchises for the generation of electricity.”191 Imple-
mentation required a second passage in 2018, which voters re-
jected.192 If voters had approved the measure a second time, it 
would have required the state’s legislature to enact legislation 
by July 1, 2023 that restructured the electricity sector and “in-
clude[d] provisions to reduce costs to customers, protect against 
service disconnections and unfair practices, and prohibit the 
granting of monopolies and exclusive franchises for the genera-
tion of electricity.”193 
The ballot measure caused energy stakeholders in the 
state to grapple with the same issues that have arisen in states 
that previously restructured their electricity sectors. NV En-
ergy, the state’s largest electricity provider and a rate-regu-
lated monopoly, released principles that it believed should 
guide any restructuring process, including protecting the util-
ity from stranded assets.194 
The Nevada ballot measure is another cautionary tale for 
electric utilities. Increased costs arising from cancelled nuclear 
power plants in the 1970s and 1980s are viewed as a contri-
buting factor that led states to consider restructuring.195 Simi-
 
 191. Barbara K. Cegavske, Secretary of State for the State of Nevada, 
Statewide Ballot Questions 2016, at 34 (2016), https://www.leg.state.nv.us/ 
Division/Research/VoteNV/BallotQuestions/2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/T6XG-U9U5]. 
 192. Associated Press, Nevadans Approve All but One Statewide Question, 
KOLO (Nov. 7, 2018, 12:07 PM), https://www.kolotv.com/content/news/nevadans-
approve-all-but-one-statewide-question-499964552.html [https://perma.cc/V45U-
WGRF]. 
 193. Id. 
 194. NV ENERGY, NEVADA’S ENERGY FUTURE: KEY PRINCIPLES 2 (2016), 
https://www.nvenergy.com/brochures_arch/key-principles.pdf [https://perma.cc/DV 
L5-JX54]. 
 195. See, e.g., Jim Rossi, The Political Economy of Energy and Its Implications 
for Climate Change Legislation, 84 TUL. L. REV. 379, 406 (2009) (“Price gaps and 
cost differentials between different geographic areas changed the incentives for 
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lar circumstances now exist in South Carolina, Georgia, and 
Mississippi due to cancelled projects and significant cost over-
runs. Prior to the 2018 election, NV Energy responded to the 
threat of the Energy Choice Initiative by committing to double 
its renewable energy capacity by 2023 if voters rejected the 
proposed change.196 
IV. LESSONS FOR ELECTRICITY-SECTOR COMPETITION 
Competition will continue to steer the evolution of the elec-
tricity sector in both restructured and traditionally regulated 
markets.197 The questions going forward are what form compe-
tition takes and what constraints public policy places on the 
scope of competition.198 Maximizing societal benefits in both re-
structured and traditionally regulated states depends on recog-
nizing, and mitigating, instances when regulatory and market-
design choices interfere with public goals. 
The range of options available to states and the demon-
strated willingness on the part of federal and state officials to 
alter market rules highlight the importance of incorporating 
social and environmental policy goals into energy markets. 
Even if ZECs ultimately fail judicial scrutiny, states can im-
plement a number of measures to influence competitive mar-
kets, including “tax credits, land grants, direct subsidies, con-
struction of state-owned generation facilities, or reregulation of 
the energy sector.”199 Power-purchase agreements—bilateral 
contracts for electricity—may also skirt broader market com-
 
interest groups—consumers and new entrants, such as independent power 
producers—to look for relief beyond the framework of price regulation by state 
and local utility commissions.”). According to analysis by Matthew White, states 
with modest gaps between retail and wholesale rates would opt to maintain 
traditional rate regulation. White, supra note 38, at 238. 
 196. Robert Walton, NV Energy to Double Renewable Capacity—If Voters Reject 
Retail Choice, UTIL. DIVE (June 1, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/news/nv-
energy-to-double-renewable-capacity-if-voters-reject-retail-choice [https://perma.cc 
/B5UP-HQPB]. 
 197. Shi-Ling Hsu, Capital Rigidities, Latent Externalities, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 
719, 777 (2014) (“Crucial in a shift to a new electricity paradigm is the opening up 
of electricity markets to new entrants, and the introduction of competition for 
electricity consumers.”); Boyd, supra note 19, at 1635–36. 
 198. Achieving environmental goals or employment goals via reactive market 
changes may lack the support necessary for long-term success if consumers find 
themselves paying higher prices for attributes that they were not aware of and 
may not agree are worth the cost. 
 199. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016). 
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petition.200 States may seek to reincorporate some power plants 
into a utility’s rate base.201 States may also withdraw their 
utilities from RTO markets altogether and return to cost-of-
service rate making, as a power company urged Ohio lawmak-
ers to consider in 2016.202 
On the other end of the electricity-market spectrum, the 
Nevada experience demonstrates the potential for voters to de-
mand choices if vertically integrated utilities fail to provide the 
benefits available to consumers in restructured states or rate-
payers face higher costs due to cancelled projects. The South 
Carolina legislature, for example, is considering numerous pro-
posals for allocation of the sunk costs, and some stakeholders 
are advocating that the state consider restructuring the elec-
tricity sector.203 
This Section discusses four critical lessons for the future of 
the electricity sector. First, core societal values continue to 
drive electricity-sector policy and will have direct impacts on 
the evolution of the sector. Second, case-by-case efforts to sup-
port specific existing facilities are resulting in a post hoc cost-
of-service approach without direct PUC oversight of system 
needs and rates. While this approach may be justified in some 
circumstances, ensuring that market interventions deliver 
 
 200. See Elec. Supply Power Ass’n v. FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 155 FERC 
¶ 61,101 (2016); Elec. Power Ass’n v. AEP Generation Res., 155 FERC ¶ 61,102 
(2016). 
 201. See, e.g., Mont. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order No. 7323K, Final Order in 
the Matter of the Application of NorthWestern Energy for Hydro Assets Purchase, 
No. D2013.12.85, at 4 (Sept. 26, 2014) (Travis Kavulla, dissenting) (discussing the 
implications of reincorporating an asset into a utility’s rate base). 
 202. Elec. Supply Power Ass’n, 155 FERC ¶ 61,101 (2016); Gavin Bade, Re-
Regulation on the Horizon? State Plant Subsidies Point to Looming ‘Crisis’ in 
Organized Power Markets, UTIL. DIVE (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/re-regulation-vertically-integrated-utility/428639/ [https://perma.cc/B6FP-
TZ5J]; Tom Knox, Frustrated AEP CEO: Ohio Should Reverse Energy 
Deregulation or We’ll Sell Our Plants; ‘No Interest’ in Prolonged Debate with 
FERC, COLUMBUS BUS. FIRST (Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.bizjournals.com/ 
columbus/news/2016/04/28/frustrated-aep-ceo-ohio-should-reverse-energy.html 
[https://perma.cc/B6FP-TZ5J]. 
 203. S. 890, 2018 Leg., 122nd Sess. (S.C. 2018); Avery G. Wilks, Gov. 
McMaster’s Lack of Leadership to Blame for Nuclear Crisis, Rival Says, STATE 
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.thestate.com/news/politics-government/article20503 
0769.html [https://perma.cc/74NP-YAPG] (listing electricity sector deregulation as 
part of a Republican gubernatorial candidate’s platform); How to Free South 
Carolina’s Energy Market, S.C. POL’Y COUNCIL (Apr. 9, 2014), https://www.sc 
policycouncil.org/research/taxes/energy-deregulation [https://perma.cc/E7FY-PWGG] 
(advocating that the state “completely deregulate the energy industry”). 
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social benefits requires explicit consideration of the economic 
and environmental tradeoffs. Third, ZEC programs and the 
Trump administration’s proposed subsidies are reactions to 
electricity prices falling below the level necessary to deliver 
social benefits. Without proactive measures to help communi-
ties weather economic impacts and ensure that states achieve 
environmental goals, reactive, case-by-case responses will 
likely continue. Finally, policymakers in traditionally regulated 
states may harness market forces to deliver new benefits to 
ratepayers without rejecting the monopoly utility model. 
A. Enduring Value Choices 
Electricity regulation has reflected important value choices 
since the emergence of the electric utility in the early 1900s.204 
Initial oversight focused primarily on the core pillars of afford-
ability, reliability, and nondiscriminatory access. These factors 
continue to define the role of state PUCs and FERC.205 
Over time, society has added expectations to these core 
objectives, such as economic development, protecting public 
health, mitigating climate change, incentivizing innovation, 
and fostering consumer choice.206 This range reflects the sec-
tor’s broad societal impacts. Reducing emissions results in 
cleaner air.207 Affordable electricity rates may be a key crite-
rion for incentivizing economic development.208 Jobs created by 
 
 204. FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 81 (1930). 
 205. Monast, supra note 27, at 141–42 (describing the role of the PUC). These 
self-described economic regulators focus primarily on rate design for efficient 
achievement of these goals. 
 206. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, supra note 76, at 11 (“Society places value on 
attributes of electricity provision beyond those compensated by the current design 
of the wholesale market.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Jonathan Baert Wiener, On the Political Economy of Global 
Environmental Regulation, 87 GEO. L.J. 749, 752 (1999) (“Clean air is a classic 
example of a public good.”); Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Public Goods 
and Economic Development (July 27, 2004) (manuscript later published in 
UNDERSTANDING POVERTY (Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee et al. eds., 2006)), 
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/GHATAK/public.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SK7-YDYM]. But 
see Hsu, supra note 197, at 775 (“[E]conomic development generally has detracted 
from what should be the focus of government provision and subsidization: public 
goods.”). 
 208. See, e.g., Bob Mayti, Heartland Incentive Rate Sows Economic 
Development Seeds, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Feb. 13, 2018), https://www.public 
power.org/periodical/article/heartland-incentive-rate-sows-economic-development- 
seeds [https://perma.cc/V464-UFSW] (crediting an economic development incentive 
rate as contributing to economic growth). 
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construction and operation of large power plants also lay the 
foundation for delivery of public goods afforded by increased 
wealth in communities.209 Improvements in energy efficiency 
may reduce household energy bills and produce health bene-
fits.210 Mitigating climate change (a classic public goods chal-
lenge) will deliver economic and environmental benefits on a 
broader scale.211 
The shifting dynamics of electricity markets are under-
mining public policy goals. Lost jobs associated with operating 
the plants and, in the context of coal-fired power plants, the 
impacts on production and transport of coal are causing signif-
icant local economic impacts.212 In some communities, the 
power plants are among the largest employers.213 Although in-
creased construction of renewable energy facilities and infra-
structure investments are mitigating net energy job losses, the 
 
 209. Louis Kaplow, Public Goods and the Distribution of Income (Nat’l Bureau 
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9842, July 2003), https://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w9842 [https://perma/cc/DNL8-264L]. 
 210. 3 Health Benefits to Weatherizing Your Home, U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFF. 
OF ENERGY EFFICIENCY & RENEWABLE ENERGY (Oct. 26, 2017), https://energy.gov/ 
eere/articles/3-health-benefits-weatherizing-your-home [https://perma.cc/5FFN-JJ9F]. 
 211. Climate Action Benefits: Key Findings, EPA, https://www.epa.gov/cira/ 
climate-action-benefits-key-findings (last visited Dec. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/ 
Y528-ZWHV]. Markets are now achieving a similar level of decarbonization as 
would have been required had the 2009 Waxman-Markey Bill become law. In 
other instances public goods are a direct result of operational choices by electricity 
sector participants. For example, frequency regulation that is a critical component 
of reliability has been characterized as a public good. See, e.g., WILLIAM SCHULTZE 
ET AL., FACILITATING ENVIRONMENTAL INITIATIVES WHILE MAINTAINING 
EFFICIENT MARKETS AND ELECTRIC SYSTEM RELIABILITY, FINAL PROJECT 
REPORT, PSERC DOCUMENT 09-9, at 6 (Oct. 2009), https://certs.lbl.gov/sites/all/ 
files/pserc-facilitating-environ-initiatives-2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/A453-9E4V] 
(citing voltage maintenance as a public good); Lynne Kiesling & Michael 
Giberson, Presentation on Electric Network Reliability as a Public Good at 
Carnegie Mellon University Conference on Electricity Transmission in 
Deregulated Markets (Dec. 15–16, 2004), https://www.ece.cmu.edu/~electriconf/ 
2004/Kiesling%20Giberson%20-%20Reliability%20as%20a%20Public%20Good%20 
2004NOV15.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7K2-L7C4]; Paul Joskow & Jean Tirole, 
Reliability and Competitive Electricity Markets 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10472, May 2004) (“[Electricity] system collapses . . . create a 
rationale for network support services with public goods characteristics.”). 
 212. See James Van Nostrand, Why the U.S. Coal Industry and Its Jobs Are 
Not Coming Back, YALE ENV’T 360 (Dec. 1, 2016), https://e360.yale.edu/features/ 
why_us_coal_industry_and_its_jobs_are_not_coming_back [https://perma.cc/E9CG 
-RLX4] (explaining many reasons for why lost coal jobs are not coming back). 
 213. See Justin Worland, Coal’s Last Kick, TIME (Mar. 18, 2017), 
http://time.com/coals-last-kick/ [https://perma.cc/G3C6-33BB] (describing how the 
severe impact of lost coal jobs in West Virginia is due to the strong reliance on the 
industry). 
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different locations of the newer jobs and the different expertise 
required for those jobs means that the opportunities are often 
not interchangeable.214 
Early retirement of nuclear power plants also directly im-
pacts electricity-sector greenhouse gas emissions. For example, 
emissions in the ISO-NE service territory rose 7 percent after 
the closure of the Vermont Yankee nuclear facility, halting a 
trend of falling emissions in the region.215 
Some observers may be tempted to dismiss ZECs and 
Trump administration proposals as simply rent seeking by in-
fluential firms and political maneuvering by elected officials 
concerned about the electoral impacts of plant closures. There 
is evidence to support these claims.216 Subsidies for economi-
cally vulnerable nuclear and coal-fired power plants result in 
higher electricity prices for ratepayers and benefit only a few 
facilities in a state.217 A single company owns many of the 
facilities that benefit from the ZEC requirements and has been 
advocating for financial support for its nuclear power plant for 
years.218 
 
 214. See Nadja Popovich, Today’s Energy’s Jobs Are in Solar, Not Coal, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/25/climate/ 
todays-energy-jobs-are-in-solar-not-coal.html [https://perma.cc/4H3L-4UEH] (pro-
viding maps of and information on where different types of energy jobs are being 
created in the United States). 
 215. William Opalka, CO2 Emissions Increase in ISO-NE: Loss of Nuclear 
Plant Reverses Trend, RTO INSIDER (Feb. 22, 2016), https://www.rto 
insider.com/co2-new-england-22278 [https://perma.cc/82M7-DVEK] (“CO2 emis-
sions in ISO-NE had declined 26% from 2001 through 2014.”). 
 216. There is an argument that the price supports for the Millstone plant in 
Connecticut are pure rent seeking. According to an MIT study, the Millstone plant 
is among the most profitable nuclear facilities operating in competitive markets. 
Geoffrey Haratyk, Early Nuclear Retirements in Deregulated U.S. Markets: 
Causes, Implications and Policy Options 6 (MIT Ctr. for Energy & Envtl. Policy 
Research, Working Paper No. 2017-009, Mar. 2017). The governor has ordered the 
state to conduct its own analysis of the facility’s financial viability. Conn. Exec. 
Order No. 59 (July 25, 2017), https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/32CB330A0E0B415284 
EB60E71C54C1A6.pdf [https://perma.cc/MB2A-SX4Y]. 
 217. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163-64, 2017 WL 3008289, 
at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017); Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. 
Supp. 3d 554, 562–63 (S.D.N.Y. 2017). 
 218. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83; Tomich & Rahim, 
supra note 90 (stating that Exelon will receive an estimated $500 million 
annually from ZEC payments). Exelon has engaged in a years-long lobbying effort 
in Illinois to win state subsidies. See Jeffrey Tomich, Bill to Save Exelon Nuclear 
Plants Proposes Vast Rewrite of Ill. Law, E&E NEWS (Nov. 16, 2016), 
https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060045842 [https://perma.cc/C7ZE-Y4ZY]. 
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The Trump administration’s claims that coal and nuclear 
subsidies are required to ensure reliability are even more sus-
ceptible to the rent seeking and political posturing criticisms. 
President Trump has made no secret of his intent to pursue his 
campaign promise to protect coal-related jobs.219 If imple-
mented, the administration’s efforts will also benefit a small 
number of established market participants and hinder market 
actors that are benefitting from current energy prices. 
Yet, characterizing these efforts as raw politics or rent-
seeking fails to appreciate the forces that laid the groundwork 
for the alleged rent seeking to be successful.220 Despite their 
differences, ZECs and the Trump administration proposals are 
responses to economic impacts and, in the case of ZECs, envi-
ronmental impacts caused by the unanticipated shifts in en-
ergy markets. These responses are important reminders that 
policymakers will continue to intervene in electricity markets 
when those markets are not achieving core social and political 
goals. As Professor David Spence observed in 2008, restruc-
tured energy markets cannot survive without political support 
and obvious near-term benefits.221 
B. Hybrid Cost-of-Service Interventions 
The current suite of state ZEC requirements contribute to 
state decarbonization goals by supporting economically vulner-
able nuclear power plants. The New York Clean Energy Stan-
dard, for example, explicitly links the supply of ZECs to the 
historic electricity output at three economically vulnerable nu-
clear power plants but withholds ZEC payments for the state’s 
fourth nuclear facility because it was deemed financially via-
ble.222 In Connecticut, the new ZEC requirements aim to keep 
 
 219. Darryl Fears, Trump Promised to Bring Back Coal Jobs. That Promise 




 220. See Spence, supra note 121, at 981 (explaining that politics and 
subsequent statutes passed have greatly influenced the energy market over the 
years). 
 221. Spence, supra note 29, at 795. 
 222. See N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 130, 155–57; see 
also Scott DiSavino, N.Y. Regulators Approve Clean Energy Standard with 
Nuclear Subsidies, REUTERS (Aug. 1, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
new-york-nuclear-idUSKCN10C2Z6 [https://perma.cc/EM2P-JGPB]. 
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one nuclear facility operational.223 Like New York, the Illinois 
ZEC payments support two facilities that would otherwise re-
tire but do not apply to nuclear units that are financially 
sound.224 These approaches are not substantially different from 
traditional PUC rate cases, wherein state commissions deter-
mine the revenue requirements of regulated utilities and set 
rates at a level that allows utilities to remain financially 
viable.225 In both instances, power plant operators receive com-
pensation at a level sufficient to cover operating expenses and 
provide a level of profits for the firms. 
The similarities between market interventions in competi-
tive electricity markets and traditional PUC rate cases do not 
mean that the interventions are unjustified. For example, the 
New York PSC estimates a $4 billion benefit in the first two 
years of the ZEC program, primarily in terms of mitigating 
greenhouse gas emissions, compared to a cost of $1 billion.226 
Based on this analysis, direct compensation for low-carbon 
baseload generation is a cost-effective strategy to achieve near-
term state decarbonization goals.227 Furthermore, state mea-
sures to prevent early retirement of key nuclear power plants 
may be the only viable strategy to meet the goals.228 
 
 223. See Peter Maloney, Dominion’s Millstone Nuclear Plant Could Warrant 
Subsidies, Draft Report Says, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.utility 
dive.com/news/dominions-millstone-nuclear-plant-could-warrant-subsidies-draft-
report-s/515406/ [https://perma.cc/7V3W-X57Z]. 
 224. Vill. of Old Mill Creek v. Star, No. 17 CV 1163–64, 2017 WL 3008289 
(N.D. Ill. July 14, 2017); Nuclear Plants Account for More than Half of Electricity 
Generation in Illinois, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN. (May 5, 2017), 
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=31092 [https://perma.cc/EH8C-
EKNN] (noting that Exelon announced plans to retire two nuclear power plants in 
Illinois but canceled the plans after the state enacted the ZEC program); 
Complaint at 2–3, Coal. for Competitive Elec. v. Zibelman, 272 F. Supp. 3d 554 
(S.D.N.Y. 2017); S.B. 2814, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2016). 
 225. See Monast, supra note 27, at 145 (“[T]he rates must allow utilities to 
recover costs that were prudently incurred, maintain the financial integrity of the 
firm, compensate equity investors for the risks they assume, and enable the firm 
to attract needed capital.”). 
 226. Tomich & Rahim, supra note 90 (citing figures from the July 8, 2016 New 
York PSC proposal). 
 227. N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83. 
 228. Id. at 19 (“[L]osing the carbon-free attributes of this generation before the 
development of new renewable resources between now and 2030 would 
undoubtedly result in significantly increased air emissions due to heavier reliance 
on existing fossil-fueled plants or the construction of new gas plants to replace the 
supplanted energy.”). 
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Although this article presents ZECs as a case study on the 
motivations for post hoc market interventions, ZEC implemen-
tation also provides a model for incorporating a cost-of-service 
approach into competitive markets. The New York PSC imple-
mented ZEC requirements after a lengthy and detailed process. 
The PSC retains oversight of the program and may adjust it if 
necessary. The ZEC payments are directly related to pre-exist-
ing state decarbonization goals and the PSC determined that 
ZECs are the only viable option to achieve those goals. The 
program delivers additional benefits, such as job protection for 
power plant employees. These measures suggest criteria for de-
termining whether market interventions are necessary and jus-
tifying the costs imposed on ratepayers and other market par-
ticipants. 
The White House proposals, on the other hand, demon-
strate the potential to abuse the strategy of compensating pow-
er plants for particular attributes (e.g., on-site fuel supplies). 
As discussed above, these proposals purportedly seek to main-
tain a reliable electricity sector but are instead motivated by 
campaign promises and rapid shifts in the economics of coal-
fired power plants. The Trump administration’s efforts are not 
necessary to ensure a reliable electricity system, and there is 
little evidence to support the claims that a grid emergency is 
imminent if existing coal and nuclear power plants retire. 
Even in instances where a post hoc cost-of-service ap-
proach is justified, there are financial, social, and environmen-
tal tradeoffs that government officials should consider before 
intervening.229 Companies operating in competitive markets 
make investments based on existing market rules and reason-
able expectations about the future. When policymakers imple-
ment subsidies to prevent plant retirements that would other-
wise occur due to market dynamics, the generation sources that 
otherwise would outcompete the subsidized plants may lose 
market share, or at least fail to gain market share after nu-
clear facilities retire.230 Ratepayers will also face higher costs. 
 
 229. See New York Electricity Supply Costs to Increase in 2017–PSC Approves 




 230. Saqib Rahim & Jeff Tomich, Dynegy Forges On in Turbulent Power 
Markets, CEO Says, E&E NEWS: ENERGY WIRE (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.ee 
news.net/energywire/2018/02/01/stories/1060072589 [https://perma.cc/8LFD-BCPS]. 
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For example, Bloomberg projects an annual cost of up to $3.9 
billion if all nuclear power plants in the Northeast and Mid-
Atlantic states—all states relying on RTO-managed competi-
tive electricity markets—receive subsidies at the same level as 
those currently available in New York.231 
Furthermore, subsidizing economically vulnerable power 
plants in competitive markets could constrain the role of 
emerging energy options, such as utility-scale storage.232 In 
contrast to emissions markets, which allow market partici-
pants to determine the lowest cost strategy to comply with 
emission limits, compensating existing power plants for certain 
attributes does not incentivize other actors to take steps to re-
duce emissions or improve reliability. 
A dissenting opinion in a 2014 Montana PSC decision to 
reincorporate a hydroelectric facility into a utility’s rate base 
highlights another concern with requiring supplemental com-
pensation to protect power plants in competitive electricity 
markets. As then-chair of the PSC stated: 
The Commission’s Order turns the free market on its 
head. . . . The proposition that underlies this business trans-
action then, is simple: The government (i.e., this Commis-
sion) is severing the bond between an asset’s performance 
relative to the market and the revenues the asset’s owner 
will earn. In so doing, the Commission unencumbers the 
shareholders of the merchant utility from a risk and au-
thorizes a generous payment to them. At the same time, the 
Commission redistributes that risk (which has never gone 
away, only moved) by socializing it to the monopolized cus-
tomer base of the regulated utility. . . . 
 
 231. Jonathan Crawford, U.S. Consumers May Be $3.9 Billion ‘Losers’ From 
Nuclear Aid, BLOOMBERG MKTS. (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2017-03-21/consumers-would-be-3-9-billion-losers-from-nuclear-subsidies 
[https://perma.cc/ZUC3-B4U6]. 
 232. Cost-effective utility scale storage projects are beginning to emerge. For 
example, a recent Xcel solicitation for a storage project returned an “unprece-
dented” response, with some prices falling well below the cost of storage power 
purchase agreements finalized in 2017. Robert Walton, Xcel Solicitation Returns 
‘Incredible’ Renewable Energy, Storage Bids, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 8, 2018), https:// 
www.utilitydive.com/news/xcel-solicitation-returns-incredible-renewable-energy-
storage-bids/514287/ [https://perma.cc/TQL7-EWRA] (“Wind energy with battery 
storage was bid at $21/MWh, just $3 higher than wind-only. In [a 2017] Arizona 
deal . . . the addition of storage added about $15/MWh to the power purchase 
agreement bid.”). 
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There are few precedents for a government to do what we 
are doing. Only a relatively short time after the divestiture 
of this property to the free market, we are marching back in, 
removing it and its production from the marketplace, and 
shackling it to a captive set of customers at a substantial 
mark-up from its book value (an “acquisition premium” in 
the phraseology that has been presented to us).233 
The same critique applies to the Trump administration’s 
proposed subsidies. Even though the subsidies would not rein-
corporate power plants into a utility’s rate base, they would 
shift risk from power plant operators to ratepayers and other 
market participants. 
Furthermore, federally imposed market subsidies forgo the 
benefit of oversight by a system operator or PUC. Regional 
transmission operators (RTOs)234 and utility commissions con-
sider power plant compensation in light of overall system 
needs. The approaches have flaws, as described above. None-
theless, there is a common set of criteria applied to questions of 
power plant value and compensation. 
C. Implicit Market Floors for Economic and 
Environmental Goals 
Efforts to ensure the economic viability of existing nuclear 
and coal-fired power plants in competitive electricity markets 
expose two gaps created by low wholesale electricity prices: job 
protection and environmental protection. Had prices remained 
high enough to keep the nuclear (and in the case of the Depart-
ment of Energy’s proposed rule, coal-fired) facilities operating, 
price supports presumably would not be in place at the state 
level or proposed at the federal level. This suggests that there 
is an implicit market floor for the provision of social goods in 
competitive electricity markets—that is, a price point below 
which electricity markets are no longer delivering certain 
public goods that society expects of the electricity sector. 
Viewed in this light, ZECs are an attempt by state officials to 
 
 233. Mont. State Pub. Serv. Comm’n, supra note 201, at 3–4. 
 234. RTOs oversee transmission systems and oversee auctions in competitive 
electricity markets. 
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increase revenue for the plants deemed necessary to ensure the 
provision of the social benefits. 
Floor prices arise in other market design contexts.235 For 
example, the California Cap-and-Trade Program and the 
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) carbon market in 
the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions seek to incentivize 
investments in low-carbon infrastructure by increasing the cost 
of emitting greenhouse gases. Low allowance prices may fail to 
motivate investments in low-carbon infrastructure and thus 
undermine the public policy goals of such market design pro-
grams. The California and RGGI markets address this issue by 
establishing price floors for their allowance auctions.236 
RTO capacity auctions also rely on floor prices to ensure 
that the economic signals are sufficient to ensure the future 
reliability of their respective grids.237 The market floors for ca-
pacity auctions and carbon markets illustrate a key risk asso-
ciated with low market prices—without a sufficient price to in-
centivize construction and maintenance of power plants, the 
grid may not be able to meet future demand. This point re-
ceives less attention in public debates than does the risk of 
high prices and may seem counterintuitive when the primary 
argument in favor of competitive markets is the potential for 
competition to result in lower prices. 
The unanticipated economic vulnerability of nuclear power 
plants in competitive electricity markets and the subsequent 
efforts by states and the U.S. Department of Energy to provide 
 
 235. Floor prices are commonly used in auctions. See, e.g., Steven L. Good & 
Celeste M. Hammond, Real Estate Auctions—Legal Concerns for an Increasingly 
Preferred Method of Selling Real Property, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 765, 776–
77 (2006) (describing the use of auction reserves in real estate auctions). 
 236. In the RGGI context, the focus is exclusively on electricity generation. 
Elements of RGGI, RGGI INC., http://www.rggi.org/design/overview (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/EZ75-L58Y]. The California market covers 
additional sectors. CAL. AIR RES. BD., CAP-AND-TRADE INSTRUCTIONAL GUIDANCE, 
CHAPTER 2: IS MY COMPANY SUBJECT TO THE CAP-AND-TRADE REGULATION? 20–
22 (2012), https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/guidance/chapter2.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/BP54-CGNJ]. Carbon markets may seek to achieve other social goals as 
well, such as funding investments in innovative technologies or mitigating price 
impacts for certain populations, locations, or economic sectors. See Carbon Market 
Cooperation, ENVTL. DEF. FUND, https://www.edf.org/climate/carbon-market-
cooperation (last visited Feb. 23, 2018) [https://perma.cc/V76F-QJCC]. 
 237. See, e.g., Markets: Results of the Annual Forward Capacity Auctions, ISO-
NE, https://www.iso-ne.com/about/key-stats/markets (last visited Feb. 4, 2018) 
[https://perma.cc/SP69-GEER] (listing floor prices for annual forward capacity 
auctions). 
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additional payments to keep the plants operational point to a 
minimum price necessary to provide social goods. This is not to 
suggest that there is, or should be, a specified minimum price 
for electricity in competitive markets. It does, however, demon-
strate the intersection between social goals and market dynam-
ics. The ZEC programs and the economic shifts underlying the 
Trump administration’s proposals expose the risk to competi-
tive electricity markets if policymakers and grid operators fail 
to proactively address social and environmental concerns. 
The remainder of this subsection outlines two alternate 
strategies for mitigating energy-related job losses and achiev-
ing long-term environmental protection goals: building on the 
precedent of competitive transition charges implemented dur-
ing the initial state restructuring process and incorporating a 
carbon price directly into RTO auctions. 
1. Addressing Employment Impacts of Retiring 
Power Plants 
Job losses resulting from changes in competitive electricity 
markets represent a new wave of social costs resulting from re-
structuring. During the initial restructuring process, states 
made policy choices to ensure the continued provision of public 
goods resulting from an affordable and reliable electricity sec-
tor.238 Local distribution companies (also referred to as load-
serving entities or LSEs) inherited the utilities’ duty to serve 
all customers within their respective service territories.239 
Some states implemented temporary limits on retail rates post-
restructuring and established programs to assist low-income 
residents.240 PUCs retained authority to oversee system reli-
ability.241 
 
 238. Rossi, supra note 39, at 1294–95. 
 239. See id. 
 240. See Barbara R. Alexander, Managing Default Service to Provide Consumer 
Benefits in Restructured States: Avoiding Short-Term Price Volatility, U.S. DEP’T 
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (June 2003), https://liheapch.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/defserv 
intro.htm [https://perma.cc/4X9V-S2R9]. 
 241. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of State Util. Consumer Advocates, Comment on 
Rules Concerning Certification of the Electric Reliability Organization; and 
Procedures for the Establishment, Approval and Enforcement of Electric 
Reliability Standards, Second Technical Conference, Docket No. RM05-30-000, at 
6 (Dec. 9, 2005), http://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20051209103606-Popowsky, 
%20NASUCA.pdf [https://perma.cc/XG8N-TB6A] (“[E]ven in a restructured state 
such as Pennsylvania, it can be seen that the state General Assembly believed 
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The approach to stranded asset recovery is a particularly 
instructive model for addressing job losses. Requiring utilities 
to divest themselves of generation assets presented the risk 
that the firms and their investors would not recover the full 
value of investments once deemed prudently incurred by the 
state PUC.242 Although many utilities would have had strong 
legal claims if states had denied recovery of any stranded costs, 
it is not clear that they would have recovered the full value of 
the undepreciated power plants.243 
As Steve Isser notes, stranded asset recovery was a politi-
cal response as well as a legal one. 
Utility consultants tried to portray the issue as one of eco-
nomic efficiency and legal rights rather than as a political 
question of how to distribute the cost of a socially desirable 
transition in market structure. Ostensibly, the recovery of 
stranded costs reflected states accepting their obligations 
under the “regulatory compact,” in lieu of being forced to 
honor their agreements by the courts.244 
Rather than fight the issue in courts, states implemented 
competitive transition charges (CTCs) to allow recovery of the 
stranded costs through retail rates collected by the local distri-
bution companies.245 Recoverable stranded costs included “reg-
 
that the state PUC would continue to exercise its authority to maintain the 
reliability of all facets of electricity service.”). RTOs, FERC, and the National 
Electricity Reliability Council play important roles in ensuring system reliability. 
See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ENSURING ELECTRICITY SYSTEM RELIABILITY, 
SECURITY, AND RESILIENCE 4-4 (2017), https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2017/ 
02/f34/Chapter%20IV—Ensuring%20Electricity%20System%20Reliability%2C%20 
Security%2C%20and%20Resilience.pdf [https://perma/cc/42LX-PBNK]. 
 242. See Portland Gen. Elec. Co., Oregon Pub. Util. Comm’n Order No. 95-322 
(1995). 
 243. See William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, Stranded Cost Recovery: Fair 
and Reasonable, FORTNIGHTLY MAG. (May 15, 1995), https://www.fortnightly.com/ 
fortnightly/1995/05-0/stranded-cost-recovery-fair-and-reasonable [https://perma.cc/ 
SQU6-XA2H]. 
 244. ISSER, supra note 20, at 201. Social outcomes included protecting 
investors, including pension funds. 
 245. See, e.g., Walter R. Hall II, Securitization and Stranded Cost Recovery, 25 
ENERGY L.J. 173, 191–92 (2004) (describing Pennsylvania’s competitive transition 
charge); Scott B. Finlinson, The Pains of Extinction: Stranded Costs in the 
Deregulation of the Utah Electric Industry, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 173, 205 
(describing California’s competitive transition charge); Alan Miller & Adam 
Serchuk, The Promise and Peril in a Restructured Electric System, 12 NAT. 
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ulatory assets, the diminished value of generating plant assets, 
above-market purchase power contracts and costs required to 
renegotiate or buy out certain contracts.”246 
Job losses and impacts on local economies are another so-
cial cost of restructuring, and states could utilize the CTC 
model to provide job retraining, funds for economic develop-
ment, pension funding, and other societal needs in the after-
math of plant closings.247 In some locations, retiring plants are 
the largest employers.248 Electricity-sector job losses may also 
extend throughout the supply chain, impacting rail companies 
that transport coal and communities dependent upon coal min-
ing.249 Coal mining communities in the Appalachian states, for 
example, suffer from some of the worst poverty rates in the 
country.250 Funding for job retraining and economic develop-
ment in those areas could not only contribute to local econo-
mies but also produce the social benefits associated with pov-
erty alleviation.251 
An employment-focused Energy Transition Charge would 
also address an important political challenge presented by com-
petitive electricity markets. Leaving decisions regarding plant 
closure to market forces rather than PUC rate setting exposes 
employees at power plants, as well as employees throughout 
the power plants’ fuel supply chain, to job loss in the event of 
 
RESOURCES & ENV’T 118, 149 (1997) (describing California’s competitive 
transition charge). 
 246. Tom Lumsden et al., Electric Utility Deregulation Creates Winners & 
Losers What’s the Effect on Utilities’ Financial Statements, 1999 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J. 26, 26. 
 247. Other closely related models are also available, such as the system 
benefits charge that some states implemented to “fund public policy initiatives not 
expected to be adequately addressed by . . . competitive electricity markets.” 
System Benefits Charge, N.Y. STATE DEP’T PUB. SERV., http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/ 
PSCWeb.nsf/All/58290EDB9AE5A89085257687006F38D1 (last updated June 3, 
2014) [https://perma.cc/34ZM-QCCK]. 
 248. See Tom Henry, FirstEnergy Executive: Davis-Besse Plant Headed for 
Premature Closure, BLADE (Jan. 26, 2018), http://www.toledoblade.com/business/ 
2018/01/25/FirstEnergy-executive-Davis-Besse-plant-headed-for-premature-closure 
.html [https://perma.cc/5QWP-93M4]. 
 249. Haerer & Pratson, supra note 123, at 90. 
 250. See Andria Caruthers, Mapping Poverty in the Appalachian Region, 
CMTY. COMMONS (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.communitycommons.org/2016/08/ 
mapping-poverty-in-the-appalachian-region [https://perma.cc/6XV3-E7NY]. 
 251. See Parija Kavilanz, How This Kentucky Coal Town Is Trying to Bring Its 
Economy Back to Life, CNN MONEY (Nov. 8, 2017, 8:05 AM), http://money.cnn. 
com/2017/11/08/news/economy/hazard-kentucky-coal-jobs/index.html [https://perma. 
cc/5ADE-Q5QD]. 
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changing market forces.252 The Department of Energy’s Pro-
posed Grid Resiliency Pricing Rule and “War on Coal” rhetoric 
during the Obama Administration and 2016 election shine a 
bright light on the economic, political, and environmental im-
pacts of ignoring job losses resulting from rapid shifts in the 
electricity sector.253 
2. Meeting State Environmental Protection Goals 
ZEC programs demonstrate the central role of environ-
mental protection in electricity markets.254 State energy and 
environmental mandates operating in parallel with electricity 
markets is nothing new. Even as states moved to restructure 
their electricity markets, they were also implementing renew-
able portfolio and energy efficiency standards to promote clean 
energy technologies.255 The California Cap-and-Trade Program 
and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative impose carbon 
prices on electricity generators, impacting their relative com-
petitiveness in electricity markets.256 These market-based stra-
tegies complement other state and federal environmental reg-
ulations.257 
If the courts uphold the ZEC program design and market 
prices continue to fall below the level necessary to maintain (or 
incentivize construction of) facilities necessary to meet ZEC 
program goals, states may increasingly turn to price supports 
to correct what they perceive as market gaps. If the courts ul-
 
 252. See M. Scott Niederjohn, Regulatory Reform and Labor Outcomes in the 
U.S. Electricity Sector, 126 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 10, 14–18 (May 2003); see also 
Russell Gold, At Modern Utilities, Jobs Go Up in Smoke, WALL ST. J., Jan. 16, 
2018, at B1. 
 253. See, e.g., Gavin Bade, Trump Touts End of ‘War on Beautiful, Clean Coal’ 
in State of the Union, UTIL. DIVE (Jan. 31, 2018), https://www.utilitydive.com/ 
news/trump-touts-end-of-war-on-beautiful-clean-coal-in-state-of-the-union/516000 
[https://perma.cc/WMR6-FASR]; Michael Grunwald, Inside the War on Coal, 
POLITICO (May 26, 2015), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2015/05/inside-
war-on-coal-000002 [https://perma.cc/CUD6-7HNH] (“The industry and its sup-
porters use ‘war on coal’ as shorthand for a ferocious assault by a hostile [Obama] 
White House.”). 
 254. See, e.g., N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 2. 
 255. Ryan Wiser et al., Assessing the Costs and Benefits of US Renewable 
Portfolio Standards, 12 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 1, 2 (2017). 
 256. California Air Board Approves Controversial Greenhouse Gas Cap-and-
Trade Rules, MARTEN LAW (Nov. 2, 2011), http://www.martenlaw.com/newsletter/ 
20111102-calif-ghg-cap-and-trade-rules [https://perma.cc/U2UG-8RFZ]. 
 257. Id. 
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timately overturn ZEC requirements, these same states may 
pursue their environmental and energy policies via other mea-
sures that are less directly linked to RTO market prices.258 
The Federal Power Act’s “just and reasonable” standard 
provides FERC sufficient discretion to allow RTO markets to 
incorporate a carbon price into their rate setting mecha-
nisms.259 Energy markets already reflect compliance costs for 
existing environmental regulations. Neglecting to anticipate 
changes in environmental policy has direct impacts on the cost 
of electricity.260 Furthermore, RTOs and utilities already in-
clude carbon prices in their long-term planning, reinforcing the 
view that mitigating the risk of future environmental regula-
tions is an important component of electricity-sector manage-
ment.261 
While states may conclude that subsidizing certain uncom-
petitive existing facilities is necessary to achieve climate policy 
goals, this strategy is less efficient than a broad market signal 
incentivizing low carbon investments. New York’s ZEC pro-
gram is based on the Obama administration’s assessment of 
the social cost of carbon.262 Although ZECs act as a type of car-
bon price, they function differently than a carbon market such 
as RGGI. ZECs focus on maintaining viability for a small num-
ber of specific facilities.263 In the case of New York, only three 
facilities will receive ZEC price supports.264 Carbon pricing via 
sector-wide cap-and-trade programs or carbon taxes creates 
incentives for a much broader group of market participants to 
 
 258. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1299 (2016) (noting 
state options to promote electricity policy goals). 
 259. Peskoe, supra note 40, at 12–15; STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, 
BERKELEY CTR. FOR L. ENERGY AND ENV’T & BERKELEY ENERGY AND CLIMATE 
INST., ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION, VOL. 2: FERC 10–
13 (2014). 
 260. Jonas Monast & David Hoppock, Designing CO2 Performance Standards 
for a Transitioning Electricity Sector: A Multi-Benefits Framework, 44 ENVT’L L. 
REP. 11068, 11073 (2014); Peskoe, supra note 40. 
 261. JIM LAZAR & DAVID FARNSWORTH, REG. ASSISTANCE PROJECT, 




 262. Shelley Welton, Electricity Markets and the Social Project of Decarbon-
ization, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 1067, 1087 (2018). 
 263. See N.Y. Clean Energy Standard Order, supra note 83, at 156–57. 
 264. Id. 
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move away from higher-emitting generation and incentivizes 
investments in lower-emitting options.265  
Proactively addressing environmental goals could also help 
states mitigate other impacts of the rapid electricity-sector 
transformation. Providing long-term signals regarding emis-
sion limits, for example, may allow electric power companies to 
focus investments on lower-emitting generation options. This, 
in turn, allows for a more deliberate transition away from 
higher-emitting resources, thus providing more certainty re-
garding energy jobs and allowing states to take measures to as-
sist with retraining and economic development efforts. 
Strategies to address the environmental impacts of the 
electricity system may vary. In addition to environmental mar-
kets or compensation for desirable environmental attributes 
(e.g., ZECs), policymakers can implement complementary mea-
sures such as renewable portfolio standards or traditional envi-
ronmental regulations pursuant to federal and state environ-
mental protection statutes. The important takeaway is that the 
failure to ensure environmental protection may undermine the 
economic and political stability of electricity markets.266 
D. Opportunities to Modernize Utilities via Market 
Competition 
The final lesson regarding electricity-sector competition fo-
cuses specifically on states with traditionally regulated utili-
ties. Despite the potential for PUCs to more directly manage 
fluctuations in fuel prices and new technology options, policy-
makers in these states are grappling with some of the same 
challenges as policymakers in restructured states. Low natural 
gas prices are also causing vertically integrated monopolies to 
shutter coal-fired power plants, and they raise questions 
regarding the future viability of existing nuclear power plants. 
Incorporating an energy transition charge could help states 
fund economic development efforts, provide job retraining, 
bolster pensions, and provide social services for employees and 
communities affected by plant closures. Similarly, forward-
thinking environmental policies could provide greater certainty 
 
 265. See Gilbert E. Metcalf, Designing a Carbon Tax to Reduce U.S. 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 3 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 63, 68–74 (2009). 
 266. See Spence, supra note 121, at 986–89. 
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so utilities and PUCs could manage capital investments and 
plant closures in a manner that better avoids rapid plant clo-
sures and at least partially mitigates stranded asset con-
cerns.267 
Policymakers in traditionally regulated states also have an 
opportunity to foster new approaches to generate investments, 
risk analysis, and consumer choice by increasing opportunities 
for third parties to compete with monopoly utilities. In this 
sense, the threat of market competition may provide a set of ex-
ternal threats that motivate the utility to innovate in terms of 
technologies, grid management, and customer services.268 This 
subsection introduces two such strategies. The first describes 
options for utilizing competitive procurement to achieve public 
policy goals. The second explores options for inducing utilities 
to pursue new business strategies by increasing the risk of 
market competition. 
1. Implementing Public Policy Goals via Competitive 
Procurement 
Competitive procurement is contributing to falling renew-
able energy costs around the globe and could play a broader 
role in U.S. states that utilize the cost-of-service model for 
 
 267. See, e.g., David Hoppock et al., Benefits of Early State Action in 
Environmental Regulation of Electric Utilities: North Carolina’s Clean 
Smokestacks Act (Nicholas Instit. for Envtl. Pol’y Solutions, Duke University, 
Working Paper No. 12-05, July 2012), https://nicholasinstitute.duke.edu/ 
climate/policydesign/benefits-of-early-state-action-in-environmental-regulation-of-
electric-utilities [https://perma.cc/CBZ3-PXPV] (analyzing the impact of North 
Carolina’s Clean Smokestacks Act on the cost of complying with Obama-era Clean 
Air Act rules). 
 268. This discussion borrows from scholarship on induced innovation that 
explores how private firms react, or innovate, in response to exogenous factors 
(factors outside the direct control of the firm) that impact the firms’ 
competitiveness. Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New 
Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSPS. 
97, 99–100 (1995) (developing what has become known as the “Porter 
hypothesis”). The definition of innovation offered by these scholars tends to be 
value neutral, considering whether a change occurred, not whether the change 
satisfied specific normative criteria to demonstrate that the development was 
desirable. Richard G. Newell et al., The Induced Innovation Hypothesis and 
Energy-Saving Technological Change, 114 Q.J. ECON. 941, 944 (defining 
innovation “as the introduction of a product model with a bundle of characteristics 
that was not previously available, or the production of a previously available 
bundle of characteristics at a cost that is lower than was previously feasible”). 
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setting electricity rates.269 In traditionally regulated states, ex-
panded use of competitive procurement programs could correct 
some of the deficiencies of the cost-of-service model. A con-
sistent critique of the monopoly public utility model is the dis-
incentive for investments in renewable energy and energy effi-
ciency. Competitive procurement is already contributing to 
falling renewable energy costs around the globe and could play 
a broader role in traditionally regulated states.270  
North Carolina’s new renewable energy legislation (HB 
589) provides a useful model. Stripping the competitive bidding 
provisions in HB 589 down to their core elements, the law sets 
a target (i.e., an additional 2.6 GW of solar capacity within 
forty-five months), establishes a competitive process to achieve 
its public policy goal, allows third parties to compete with the 
utility to achieve the target, allows the utility or its nonregu-
lated subsidiaries to earn revenue if their bids are accepted, 
and ensures the utility does not exercise undue market 
power.271 Together, these provisions ensure that the public pol-
icy goal will be met and allow ratepayers to benefit if inde-
pendent (i.e., non-utility) companies can meet the goal at a 
lower cost than the utility. Traditionally regulated states could 
use similar processes to allow competitive bidding for efficiency 
projects, energy storage, and demand response. 
States could also utilize the HB 589 model to achieve other 
societal benefits without increasing risk for ratepayers. For ex-
ample, charging stations for electric vehicles present a compli-
cated chicken-and-egg problem for PUCs. Commissioners may 
be reluctant to approve capital investments and approve rate 
recovery, including the rate of return, if charging stations are 
 
 269. INT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY AGENCY, RENEWABLE POWER GENERATION 




 270. Id. at 5. 
 271. H.B. 589, 2017 Gen. Assemb., N.C. Sess. Laws 192 (N.C. 2017); 
Monitoring Analytics Is the Independent Market Monitor for PJM Interconnection, 
MONITORING ANALYTICS, http://www.monitoringanalytics.com/company/about.shtml 
(last visited Nov. 29, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CP7Q-XX5T] (noting that the 
company’s role as independent market monitor includes “monitor[ing] the 
potential of market participants to exercise undue market power, the behavior of 
market participants that is consistent with attempts to exercise market power 
and the market performance that results from the interaction of market structure 
with participant behavior”). 
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underutilized.272 Competitive bidding, combined with the abil-
ity for prices to fluctuate, could mitigate the concern. The law 
could allow firms that successfully bid on a charging station 
project to engage in retail sales and to procure electricity from 
whichever generators they choose. Companies bidding would 
bear the risk if the facilities are not used. Similar to HB 589, 
state legislative reform could permit unregulated companies af-
filiated with the monopoly to compete. This approach would 
create opportunities for companies to develop the infrastruc-
ture that will be necessary for electric vehicles to gain market 
share without placing risk on ratepayers. The competitive bid-
ding approach thus removes barriers and is agnostic regarding 
who provides the service. 
Strategically increasing competition would not address the 
challenges regarding costs for the cancelled South Carolina nu-
clear units, but it could help avoid future stranded asset risks 
by utilizing market forces to vet the viability of new generation 
projects rather than relying primarily on utility projections of 
future needs and costs. Expanding opportunities for competi-
tion could create circumstances to take advantage of emerging 
technologies such as battery storage, as well as increased pene-
tration of renewable energy, to induce monopoly utilities to 
consider additional options for meeting, or reducing, electricity 
demand.  
2. Utilizing the Risk of Competition to Spur New 
Utility Strategies 
Policymakers in traditionally regulated states may also 
utilize the prospect of competition to spur regulated monopolies 
to develop new strategies to respond to changing market condi-
tions. Both Nevada examples described above fit the mold. The 
credible risk that additional large consumers could secure their 
own low-cost renewable energy contracts or that a majority of 
voters will choose to restructure the state’s electricity sector 
could provide powerful motivation for utility executives to con-
sider alternate investments and customer options. 
Net metering—a state-based mechanism with its roots in 
PURPA and state renewable energy goals—is another example 
of state policy allowing consumers to exert greater influence 
 
 272. Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. COLO. L. REV. 571, 603 (2017). 
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over the direction of the electricity sector.273 These state pro-
grams require utilities to compensate residential and commer-
cial customers for renewable energy generation that is sold 
onto the electricity grid, and thus provide limited opportunities 
for retail and commercial customers to sell electricity to local 
utilities or grid operators. Net metering has been a subject of 
debate and criticism in recent years.274 Many of these state 
programs, which generally compensate the residential and 
commercial customers at the full retail electricity rate, have 
been in place for decades.275 The policies are receiving atten-
tion now because the cost of solar panels has fallen to a point 
where more consumers are now taking advantage of net me-
tering opportunities.276 
The growing number of consumers benefiting from net me-
tering policies, and utilities’ recognition of the potential threat 
that rooftop solar compensation programs can present to future 
utility revenues, suggests that net metering is serving as an 
external factor that induces utilities to adjust their business 
practices.277 In that sense, it is functioning as a type of innova-
tion policy that allows energy consumers to influence decisions 
at the utility. Viewed in this light, the debate over cost turns on 
more than just the fairness of compensating residential and 
commercial providers of renewable electricity at a rate that 
incorporates both the cost of generating and transporting 
 
 273. See Mark James et al., Planning for the Sun to Come Up: How Nevada 
and California Explain the Future of Net Metering, 8 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & 
ENERGY 1, 2–8 (2017). 
 274. For a description of net metering, see Steven Ferrey, Net Legal Power, 53 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221, 227–30 (2016); see also Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, 
Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: Distributed Generation and Net 
Metering, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 71–77 (2017) (analyzing shortcomings of 
net metering). 
 275. See State Net Metering Policies, NAT’L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES (Nov. 
20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/net-metering-policy-overview-and-
state-legislative-updates [https://perma.cc/6YXK-L8XP]. 
 276. See, e.g., Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO 
J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 118–19 (2015) (“As rooftop solar development 
becomes more commonplace, it is likely to dampen demand for grid-supplied 
power and thereby cut into utilities’ profits.”); Michael Wara, Competition at the 
Grid Edge: Innovation and Antitrust Law in the Electricity Sector, 25 N.Y.U. 
ENVTL. L.J. 176, 189 (2017) (“To date, the most common response by utilities to 
the disruptive challenge presented by distributed solar has been to propose 
changes to retail rate structures that act to reduce solar power’s cost advantage 
over grid-supplied energy.”). 
 277. See Rule, supra note 276, at 118–25 (summarizing utility efforts to lobby 
for changes to state net metering policies). 
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energy, as opposed to simply compensating at the rate offered 
for generation. 
While more customers are taking advantage of net meter-
ing, these customers represent a small fraction of most utilities’ 
total number of ratepayers.278 The actual cost that net 
metering is currently imposing on most electricity consumers is 
therefore low.279 If concerns about the prospect of increased 
participation by retail and commercial consumers cause utili-
ties to develop cost-effective strategies to respond to consumer 
demand for renewable energy, net metering could provide an 
efficient policy mechanism to motivate utilities to pursue, and 
PUCs to approve, new programs that provide societal benefits 
while maintaining affordable and reliable power. 
Society may be willing to pay more for innovative technol-
ogies, or use of those technologies, if they offer societal benefits. 
In this instance, assessments of the merits of net metering 
should consider the ability for consumers to exert greater influ-
ence over the direction of the electricity sector and ensure that 
values beyond affordability are taken into consideration.280 At 
the moment, few customers are taking advantage of net meter-
ing policies.281  
Other state programs may also create external forces that 
push incumbent utilities to change behavior. Like net metering 
programs, third-party leasing for residential and commercial 
installations of solar energy removes financial barriers to 
renewable energy. These programs also allow independent (i.e., 
non-utility) companies a limited ability to sell electricity to 
retail consumers.282 Allowing third parties to access smart 
 
 278. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK SUPPLEMENT: 
EXPANDED FORECASTS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY CAPACITY AND GENERATION 
(July 2017), https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/steo/special/supplements/2017/2017_sp 
_02.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y78S-UDXF]. 
 279. See Mark Muro & Devashree Saha, Rooftop Solar: Net Metering Is a Net 
Benefit, BROOKINGS (May 23, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/rooftop-
solar-net-metering-is-a-net-benefit/ [https://perma.cc/JC65-5EKK]. 
 280. Welton, supra note 262, at 1096 (noting that electricity sector “choices and 
values . . . extend far beyond what technologies are available at what costs”). 
 281. Uma Outka, Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: Learning from 
Environmental Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789, 806–07 (2017). 
 282. See, e.g., Solar Power Free-Market Financing Act of 2015, GA. CODE ANN. 
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meter data could also allow companies to develop new services, 
inducing utilities to do the same.283 
CONCLUSION 
Competition necessarily creates winners and losers. Early 
responses to the disruptions created by sustained low natural 
gas prices rely on subsidizing facilities that find themselves 
unable to compete.284 Policymakers may determine that subsi-
dies are necessary in the short term, but longer-term solutions 
are necessary to mitigate local economic impacts of shutting 
down plants and moving to new forms of generation and 
conservation. 
Recent history and different state regulatory models allow 
a nuanced, critical view of the role of market competition and 
the implications of facilitating and restricting competition. This 
article identifies four overarching lessons that should inform 
federal and state officials as they reconsider the merits of elec-
tricity-sector competition and the market design elements nec-
essary to ensure that competition achieves, or does not under-
mine, societal goals. Most importantly, value choices remain 
central to electricity-sector governance. 
In the absence of proactive measures to achieve social 
goals while the sector evolves, reactive measures will likely 
continue. These measures could impact the sector as a whole 
and frustrate, rather than facilitate, achieving long-term social 
goals. For example, decarbonization will be expensive and 
changing market rules may result in inefficient investments 
and underutilized assets. Companies that have made recent 
investments in new, efficient natural gas combined-cycle tur-
bines—the type of investment that is causing economic pres-
sure for nuclear plants in competitive states—may have less 
market share than they would in the absence of nuclear subsi-
dies. Furthermore, the rapidly falling prices for energy storage 
could allow renewable energy to play a significant role in re-
placing generation in the event large nuclear or coal plants 
 
 283. For example, the Arkansas PSC is considering granting third parties 
access to data from advanced metering infrastructure. In the Matter of an 
Investigation of Policies Related to Distributed Energy Resources, Docket No. 16-
028-U, Order No. 5, Nov. 9, 2017, http://www.apscservices.info/pdf/16/16-028-
U_97_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5KU-T2CG]. 
 284. See Dlouhy, supra note 87. 
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retire. Without the opening created by retiring plants, there 
may be fewer opportunities for storage projects than there 
otherwise would be. 
Electricity market vacillations will continue as coal plants 
continue to retire, battery storage becomes viable, the transpor-
tation sector begins to electrify, and society continues to de-
mand that the electricity sector decarbonize. State and federal 
policymakers can take proactive steps to realize the benefits of 
competition and manage the potential downsides in restruc-
tured and traditionally regulated markets. 
 
